电邮这篇文章 Voting in collective best-choice problem with complete information
- 作者: Ivashko A.A.1
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隶属关系:
- Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center
- 期: 卷 77, 编号 8 (2016)
- 页面: 1461-1467
- 栏目: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150420
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117916080129
- ID: 150420
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详细
This paper considers a noncooperative m-player best-choice game with complete information about the quality parameters of incoming candidates. Collective decision-making is based on voting. The optimal threshold strategies and payoffs of the players are found depending on the voting threshold. The results of numerical simulation are presented.
作者简介
A. Ivashko
Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: aivashko@krc.karelia.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Petrozavodsk
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