Email this article Voting in collective best-choice problem with complete information
- Authors: Ivashko A.A.1
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Affiliations:
- Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center
- Issue: Vol 77, No 8 (2016)
- Pages: 1461-1467
- Section: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150420
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117916080129
- ID: 150420
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Abstract
This paper considers a noncooperative m-player best-choice game with complete information about the quality parameters of incoming candidates. Collective decision-making is based on voting. The optimal threshold strategies and payoffs of the players are found depending on the voting threshold. The results of numerical simulation are presented.
About the authors
A. A. Ivashko
Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center
Author for correspondence.
Email: aivashko@krc.karelia.ru
Russian Federation, Petrozavodsk
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