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No 7 (2025)
Foreign Policy
Prospects for Canada's Participation in Multilateral Alliances in the Indo-Pacific Region
Abstract
Over the past few years, Canada has sought to expand its military-political and economic ties with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) and to play a more active role there. As a means of achieving this goal, Canadian policymakers and experts are considering their country's participation in the various types of alliances and partnerships that have emerged in the IPR in recent years. Canada's greatest focus is on the AUKUS military-technology partnership, formed in 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Canada wants to participate in the second pillar of this partnership, the development of new military technologies. Canada is much less interested in participating in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Canada's interest in participating in the Quad has especially waned since the creation of the AUKUS. Canada also wants to participate in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), but in this case the initiative comes from Canadian big business rather than the government of J. Trudeau. Canada's participation in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance holds some promise. The possible admission of Japan to this alliance will transform it from an Anglo-Saxon to a Pacific alliance. With the beginning of D. Trump's second presidential term, Canada's participation in multilateral structures in the IPR has been seriously hampered. On the one hand, with the sharp deterioration of relations between the USA and Canada, membership in U.S.-centered regional alliances has lost its former appeal for Canada. On the other hand, the Trump administration would also not consider Canada a desirable partner in such regional alliances. Admitting Canada into such structures contradicts Trump's own logic that Canada should become the 51st American state. Another factor that makes it difficult for Canada to participate in multilateral structures in the IPR is the crisis in its relations with India, which is a member of many such structures and wields enormous influence in the region.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):5-13
5-13
The Indian Course of the New U.S. Administration in the Context of the U.S.-China Rivalry
Abstract
The visit of Indian Prime Minister N. Modi to Washington in February 2025, which took place less than a month after the inauguration of the 47th President of the United States, attracted considerable attention from politicians and experts. Assessments focused on the prospects for relations between the two largest democracies in the world during Donald Trump's second term. Commentators once again analyzed the motives and driving forces behind the dynamically developing U.S.-India relations, with the "China factor" once again playing a prominent role. Dialogue with New Delhi is equally important for both Washington and Beijing, including in terms of its impact on the current state and future of U.S.-China relations. They are justifiably called "the most important bilateral relationship in the world", yet they have been increasingly marked by tension and competition over the past decade. In the virtual "U.S.-China-India" triangle, an objective situation has developed where each "corner" in one way or another influences the relations between the other two. In particular, there is an obvious interdependence between the U.S.-China and U.S.-India tracks, where turbulence in the former often causes increased momentum in the latter. This is well illustrated by the fact that since the mid-2010s, including during the first presidency of D. Trump, there has been accelerated growth in relations between the U.S. and India, and this process notably coincided with increasing U.S.-China rivalry. As the events of the early months of 2025 suggest, among the shared motivation for advancing the U.S.-India dialogue, the factor of jointly "balancing the Chinese challenge" will continue to play a role.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):14-24
14-24
The Impact of U.S. President Trump on U.S.-China Relations
Abstract
The relevance of the article is due to the policy of D. Trump, who, during his first and second terms as president of the United States, established priorities on economic issues that often contradict the national interests of China, which is the third-largest trading partner of the United States. Despite this, Trump has increased pressure on China to curb the growth of its power on the world stage. This has an impact not only on the growing tension between them, but also on the entire system of international relations, which currently looks like an “unequal strategic triangle”: at one of the peaks are supporters of multipolarity in international relations, led by China and Russia; on another – adherents of monopolarity, led by the USA; states adhering to neutrality are located on the third peak. In this triangle, Washington's influence on international affairs is unstable, as the alliances it leads combine elements of competition with the United States and cooperation with China. In the future, deterioration in relations might be avoided if Trump abandons his anti-China strategy, but the chances are slim, since his international acts, signed at the beginning of his second term, indicate that his carrot-and-stick policy will continue not only towards China, but also toward others actors in international relations. This is confirmed by the analysis of Trump's policy toward China and other countries in his first and second terms, as well as by the reaction of the Chinese authorities to this policy.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):25–34
25–34
Global Security
Eurasian Security System as a Factor in Neutralizing the Quasi-Alliances of the United States in the Indo-Pacific Region
Abstract
This article examines security issues in Eurasia. Against the background of the developing situation here related to Russia's special military operation to force Ukraine to peace, the United States of America has managed to consolidate the EU and NATO. This allowed them to shift responsibility for the course and outcome of the Ukrainian crisis onto their Western European allies at the final stage of the operation. At the same time, Washington has provided itself with the opportunity to focus on the Indo-Pacific region (ITR) against the growing economic and military might of China. In an effort to prevent China's dominance in Eurasia, the United States, in contrast to the structures of international cooperation that have developed in the Asia-Pacific region, has begun to create an Indo-Pacific security architecture based on QWAD, AUCUS and other so-called quasi-alliances. At the same time, Washington is trying to destroy Beijing's partnerships with leading Eurasian countries, in particular with Russia, India, and Iran. The unilateral measures taken by the United States to «rebuild» the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region on the basis of quasi-alliances directed against China and Russia necessitate the adoption of countermeasures to neutralize them in order to ensure regional stability. The initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin to form a new Eurasian security system can be considered as one of the steps in this direction. Russia, being a member of many Eurasian associations, in particular, the SCO, the CSTO, the CICA, etc. Together with China, they are able to promote global initiatives in the interests of strengthening peace and cooperation in Eurasia and can play a leading role in shaping a comprehensive security system in Eurasia. The purpose of this work is to analyze the effectiveness of existing security systems in Eurasia and identify possible ways to modernize them and then transform them into a comprehensive Eurasian security system, capable of ensuring regional stability in the context of fundamental transformations in the world and the construction of a new world order.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):35-46
35-46
U.S. and Japan's Approaches to Cybersecurity
Abstract
Historically, Tokyo has relied entirely on Washington to develop its cyber capabilities. Bilateral cooperation was initially formed to enhance interoperability, then the focus shifted to addressing cyber threats. Today, Japan is radically revising its cybersecurity strategy, adopting offensive actions for defensive purposes and seeking to copy the American approach.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):47-57
47-57
U.S.-Chinese Controversy over the Legal Status of International Airspace
Abstract
The US-Chinese confrontation affects not only the interpretation and implementation of the norms and provisions of international maritime law, and above all the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It also concerns the legal status of the airspace over which a coastal state cannot extend its sovereignty and where absolute freedom of overflight is assumed, both for civil and military aircraft. However, Beijing is systematically trying to limit the presence of American – primarily reconnaissance – aircraft near its national borders, considering such activities an immediate threat to national security. For this purpose, completely legal mechanisms can be used, such as Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) or Flight Information Regions (FIRs). However, differing interpretations of rights and powers within these zones by the United States and China have lead to increased tensions, which in previous years have caused serious incidents.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):58-69
58-69
Geopolitics
The China-USA-Russia "Triangle" in the Arctic: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Aspects
Abstract
The problem of relations within the framework of the "strategic triangle" of the USA–China–Russia has extended to the Arctic region in recent years. Relations within the "triangle" are characterized by a certain balance of rivalry and cooperation in the spheres of geopolitics and geoeconomics, in which security and economic issues are closely intertwined and influence each other. This becomes obvious when analyzing each of its bilateral "axes": Chinese American, Russian American and Russian Chinese. The interaction of the Russian Federation and China in the development of the Arctic region is an important aspect of Russian-Chinese relations, reflecting their comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Russia and China are becoming increasingly close strategic partners, and the Arctic, among other areas, is gradually turning into an arena for potential long-term cooperation. The American Chinese axis of the "strategic triangle" of the USA–China–Russia is characterized by pronounced rivalry, alongside latent and not fully realized opportunities for cooperation. At the same time, the impetus for the rivalry comes exclusively from the American side and is based on the desire for leadership and dominance in the Arctic, rather than on a real perception of challenges and threats. U.S. Arctic policy under Trump will most likely continue to be based on strategic rivalry between great powers as the main strategic direction, emphasizing U.S. priority and dominance. US-Russian relations in the Arctic are also marked by rivalry, although the ongoing Russian American dialogue on the Ukrainian settlement, in the broader context of normalizing US-Russian relations, is making the potential for economic cooperation in the Arctic region increasingly obvious.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):70-79
70-79
Ideas and Concepts
China's Discourse on Minilateralism and Quasi-Alliances in the Context of U.S.-China Competition
Abstract
A key feature of the U.S. strategy to contain China is the use of small-group alliances involving three to four countries, aimed at China's economic and technological isolation and military encirclement. While U.S.-led minilateral formats – such as the Quad, AUKUS, and various trilateral partnerships – have been widely studied in both Western and Russian scholarship, far less attention has been paid to how Chinese experts understand minilateralism and its role in U.S.-China rivalry. This article fills that gap. Through content analysis of Chinese academic publications, it explores the context and connotations of the term “minilateralism” in Chinese discourse. It examines how Chinese scholars assess the motivations behind U.S.-led minilateral groupings and trace the evolution of Washington’s minilateral strategy. The article also presents Chinese perspectives on the prospects of this strategy during Donald Trump’s second term and possible Chinese responses. Finally, it raises the question of whether China is developing a minilateral strategy of its own. The analysis concludes that, in Chinese expert opinion, U.S. minilateralism is viewed both as a challenge to China’s foreign policy and as a sign of the decline of the U.S.-centered world order.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):111–122
111–122
Economics
Chinese Investments in the United States in the Context of U.S.–China Rivalry
Abstract
In the context of escalating U.S.–China tensions, China's technological breakthrough, the huge negative balance of bilateral trade, and the growth of Chinese investments abroad are of particular concern to the United States. Washington views China's transformation into one of the world's leading capital exporters as a serious threat. The export of foreign direct investments allows China to access advanced technologies, gain control over strategically important mineral reserves and infrastructure projects in other countries, and strengthen its political influence in various regions of the world. Regarding Chinese capital exports to the United States, the growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing is reflected in several key trends. First, there has been a sharp reduction in Chinese investments in American government securities, as China's trust in them has been undermined. Second, there is a gradual decrease in Chinese direct investment in the United States. On the one hand, this results from Washington's treats investments from China with growing suspicion and is increasingly inclined to restrict them for reasons of national security. On the other hand, these investments are becoming less attractive for the Chinese government and investors due to increased political risks. All this taken together, along with the decline in China's share in American foreign trade, indicates a fairly intensive process of decoupling of the American and Chinese economies. In addition, with regard to investments from China, the United States seeks to extend its jurisdiction to third countries, preventing expansion of Chinese capital abroad, especially in such areas as high technology, mining of critical minerals and infrastructure.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):80-93
80-93
The New Tariff Policy of the Trump Administration and the U.S.-China Relations
Abstract
In 2025, the world found itself at the epicenter of a new wave of global trade instability, following the re-election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and the announcement of large-scale tariffs on Chinese goods. This new conflict between the two countries continued the confrontation that began in 2018, when the Trump administration initiated a trade war with China. During Trump's first term, the two sides reached an agreement that was never fully implemented, leaving the conflict unresolved. However, with Trump in his second term, the tariff war with China remains a top priority for the administration. The imposition of significant tariffs on a wide range of Chinese goods is simultaneously a call for dialogue with Beijing regarding a new trade agreement and an indication of the firm anti-Chinese stance of the new Republican administration. This confrontation has become a major issue in global politics, with the fate of the global economy hanging in the balance. It is important to consider the causes, course of events, and possible consequences of a new tariff war that threatens to reformat the global economy.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):94-102
94-102
The Chinese Factor in the Foreign Economic Contradictions between the USA and the EU
Abstract
Countering China represents a systemic conflict for the United States. In his second presidential term, D. Trump is acting much more provocatively and actively than was the case under the Democratic administration of J. Biden, implementing the policy of active containment of China's economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power, enshrined in the current 2022 US National Security Strategy. China is considered the main center of power, genuinely capable of overtaking the United States in the total volume of advanced technologies within the current decade, thereby depriving the United States of its status as the leading economic force in the modern world. The EU’s position on trade and economic relations with China remains contradictory. The question of the extent to which the European Union intends to continue to play an auxiliary role as a loyal ally of the United States in their systemic confrontation with China or to be guided by its own interests in the new configuration of the global economy of the 21st century is of fundamental importance.
USA & Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2025;(7):103-110
103-110