No 9 (2024)

The current stage of US policy towards the states of the Arabian Peninsula is unfolding in an extremely challenging situation that has been developing for decades. This situation is chronic and shaped by forces of various origins, generated by both internal and external impulses. The Arabian direction of US foreign policy is facing a number of challenges in the areas of regional security, economic shifts, and oil-related changes, all of which have a significant impact on the global financial and economic environment, imposing serious consequences on both Eastern and Western countries. Clearly, this trend is further complicated by the difficult demographic, economic and political situation in the region, including the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. The deterioration of relations between the Gulf States and the United States is a complex issue involving many different factors. The ongoing conflict in Yemen and the involvement of the United States in it perpetuate the situation of unresolved previous positive initiatives for Washington in this region, which hinders American foreign policy strategists from finding rational solutions to the growing problems that pose new challenges and dangers.

In June 2022, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Paul Nakasone, disclosed that his soldiers had conducted offensive cyberattacks against Russia before the Special military operation in Ukraine began. These so-called “hunt forward” operations are part of USCYBERCOM’s doctrine of persistent engagement. This doctrine involves the personnel of the Cyber Nation Mission Forces deploying to partner countries to work with their cyber defenders in their most critical networks and computer systems. Their mission is to search for and degrade enemy activities, while also researching their tools and tactics in cyberspace. This doctrine is one of Nakasone’s key innovations in Cyber Command’s course of action. Previously, U.S. cyber operations required authorization from the U.S. President. This restriction made actions like persistent engagement and hunt forward operations nearly impossible, as they require extensive activities within other countries’ networks even before a cyberattack is prepared. It is impractical to expect the President to approve every such request. Nakasone changed this by removing the requirement for presidential authorization. Today, this allows Cyber Command to conduct such operations - both defensive and offensive - much more broadly, and they are taking full advantage of this opportunity. The problem lies in the sphere of international law - both in the field of the law of war (jus in bello) and the right to war (jus ad bellum). U.S. politicians often claim that cyber operations can achieve strategic goals without crossing the threshold of armed conflict. In any other domain actions with similar effects could provoke war but not in cyberspace. This feature is its main advantage and the reason the U.S. sabotages other countr ies’ initiatives (particularly Russian) to establish a legal regime for state use of cyberspace. However, there is no consensus among U.S. specialists about the legal basis that legitimizes such operations against another country, both internationally and domestically. Yet, this ambiguity seems to work in the U.S. favor. In fact, U.S. soldiers have attacked another country’s (Russian) territory and this has not led to a direct war between Russia and the U.S. U.S. officials consider the hunt forward operation experience in Ukraine as both successful and useful for refining U.S. strategies in cyberspace, including the National Cybersecurity Strategy and the DoD Cyber Strategy. They plan to use such tools more broadly against Russia. Currently, the U.S. is actively working in the Post-Soviet area against Russia to disrupt Russia’s national interests. Among other things, Washington is attempting to coerce Central Asian states into alignment with U.S. interests. Hunt forward operations are an obvious tool of the United States, which Russia will most likely have to counteract there.