No IV (2024)

The conflict in Ukraine, through the efforts of Western countries that have made political, financial and other way investments in it, has acquired the characteristics of a constituent one, so called “game changer” and has a significant impact on modern international relations and the characteristics of the emerging world order. In 2024, there was a significant technological escalation and geographical expansion of the conflict. Among the key topics discussed by experts was even the possibility of using nuclear weapons. The issues of confiscation of frozen Russian foreign exchange reserves and other assets were discussed in global financial circles. The article emphasizes that the conflict is in an active phase. The parties' assessments of the situation and their interests (Ukraine, Western countries, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other) radically differ. The conflict of interests is deepening. The positions of the “war party” and the pro-Ukrainian lobby are strong in the USA and in Europe. In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine the success of the conflict settlement within the framework of the negotiation process in 2025, despite the change of the presidential administration in the United States. The outcome of the conflict will determine the role and place of the Russian Federation in the new emerging world order, the degree of Russia's influence not only in different subregions of post-Soviet Eurasia, but also in the countries of the “global South”.

The Belarusian leadership considers the multi-vector policy, which until recently was limited to Minsk's constant maneuvering between Moscow and Brussels, to be the main tool for implementing the state's foreign policy goals. After the failure of the Western capitals to recognize the results of the presidential elections in the Republic of Belarus in 2020, as well as with the beginning of the SVO, Minsk was forced to switch to a single-vector orientation towards Russia. However, the desire to return to the previous foreign policy course of balancing between the two centers of power remains with official Minsk and can be realized in the event of a counter movement by Western partners. In the context of the growing confrontation between Russia and the West, the multi-vector games of the Belarusian authorities may lead to a geopolitical turn of Minsk towards the West.

The changes taking place in the region and in the world require Belarus to clarify its ideology. Belarus is experiencing a multi-vector ideological impact. The article analyzes the main factors of influence. The method of research is a comparison of external and internal factors. The question of the ideology of the Union State has been raised. The analysis shows that cooperation with Russia, primarily within the framework of the Union State, continues to be the key to the sovereignty of Belarus and the preservation of its identity. A joint Russian-Belarusian study of the possibilities of ideological strengthening of the Union State is becoming urgent. More broadly, a conceptual and practical revision of the main approaches of Russia and Belarus to key points of global development is needed.

In the autumn of 2024, presidential elections were held in Moldova. There were two rounds of voting. The incumbent president Maia Sandu and former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, supported by the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, came in the second round of elections. Sandu advocated the European integration of Moldova and the curtailment of relations with Russia and the CIS countries. In contrast, Stoianoglo was against the unilateral orientation towards the EU. He advocated strengthening Moldova’s ties with Russia and maintaining a balance in relations with the West and the East. The election was won by Sandu, who in the second round of voting was 10% ahead of her opponent. And Sandu won the election largely thanks to the votes of the Moldovan diaspora in countries of the European Union and in the United States. The elections have shown that the Moldovan society remains divided into Moldovenists and supporters of the Western path of development. Simultaneously with the first round of elections, the European Union membership referendum was held in Moldova, in which pro-Euro voters won by a small margin. Thus, Chisinau’s pro-Western course remains unchanged.

This article analyses potential of crypto-currency usage in cross-border transactions with the Central Asia (CA) countries. Based on the statistics from the region the author came to the following conclusions. Nowadays, penetration of crypto-currencies in the local societies is low and it is substantially lower than in Russia. Relation to crypto-currencies is different in various countries of the CA, but everywhere they are prohibited for use as a means of payment. Additionally due to specifics of legislations of the CA countries, usage of crypto-currencies for cross-border transactions creates extra burden for local business because there are problems with legal conversion of received crypto-currencies into local ones. All these determine low propensity of the CA business to use crypto-currencies. While last two years mutual trade between Russia and the CA countries are mainly transacted in Roubles and this substantially decreases the need to recourse to such exotic instruments as crypto-currencies. Thus at the moment we see low potential of crypto-currency usage in transactions for trade between Russia and the CA countries. However, this may change in case the status of crypto-currencies in the latter countries substantially changes. 

The article analyzes the state of the renewable energy sector in Central Asia. Particular attention is paid to external resources for the development of renewable energy sources (RES), including investments from foreign companies and support from international financial institutions. Hydrogen projects and the creation of “green” energy corridors to the European Union are also considered from this point of view. Based on the analysis of regional impediments to the development of RES; technical, financial and general economic challenges of energy corridors; limitations of the “green” development model for the region, a conclusion is made about the high importance of non-economic factors in the formation of the Central Asian renewable energy sector. In particular, businesses make special emphasis on the reputational aspects of “green” projects (including greenwashing), while local elites emphasize “normalizing” of national policies in respect to the global green agenda. Particular attention is paid to the EU and China, which use the green agenda and RES investments to project their influence in the region. It is concluded that although the development of RES will bring certain positive changes, its transformational potential for the Central Asian economies is limited. In first place this is due to the absence of a comprehensive approach for the development of innovation systems and economic institutions as an important condition for regional green growth. Increasing dependence on partner countries is also considered as a risk.

The Turkic direction, in particular the Central Asian region, is not new for the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, which has been systematically expanding its influence there since the collapse of the Soviet Union and forming a special subsystem of international relations called the “Turkic world”. Over the past few years, the forms of Turkey's interaction with the Turkic-speaking space have dramatically changed. Currently, in Turkey’s regional Central Asian policy can be traced 4 trends, which in the midterm can significantly reform both: the region and individual countries in particular. Among these trends are: the informatization and Latinization of the “Turkic world”, the intensification of contacts with neutral Turkmenistan and the formation of the foundations of Turkic-centric security.

The parliamentary elections in Georgia took place amidst polarization and confrontation, not only internal but also external. The Georgian opposition fully relied on Western support, which shifted in their favor after the start of the conflict in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Georgian Dream party focused on domestic voters, actively engaging with citizens in various regions of the country. The ruling elite managed to secure another victory, which shocked the opposition and representatives of the Western establishment. Protests are ongoing with demands for new parliamentary elections based on “fairness” and “justice”. The opposition lacks factual arguments but enjoys external support, which makes their demands appear possible and “legitimate” to a portion of Georgian society. Undoubtedly, violations occurred, and this is no secret, but they could not significantly affect the overall outcome. Therefore, if we set aside the clichéd accusations of fraud, bribery, pressure, “carousel voting”, ballot-stuffing, and, of course, interference by Russia, three fundamental factors behind the opposition's defeat emerge. First and foremost is the ideological and resource crisis of the opposition, which over the past few years has failed to offer anything new or appealing to the population. Secondly, their primary reliance on Western support and the promotion of so-called “radical Europeanness” as a slogan proved irrelevant to the majority of voters. Lastly, the active and often heavy-handed external interference by the West likely irritated neutral voters more than it advanced the interests of the opposition.

The Three Seas Initiative has become highly important in connection with the geopolitical transformations of the Central and Eastern Europe. Not only is the number of participants expanding, but also extra-regional actors with similar values ​​are being involved in consultations. In addition to the Initiative's association with infrastructure projects, including new north-south transport corridors, the military dimension of cooperation is becoming increasingly clear. Many projects have dual purpose and, in addition to economic goals, serve to increase the mobility of NATO armies. One of the tasks is to unite the transport and logistics infrastructure of the countries of NATO's eastern flank and western Ukraine. The lack of necessary funding and a different vision of the organization's purpose by a number of its participants are an obstacle to the implementation of this development logic.