电邮这篇文章 Generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with side interests of participants
- 作者: Smol’yakov E.1
-
隶属关系:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- 期: 卷 95, 编号 1 (2017)
- 页面: 37-42
- 栏目: Mathematics
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1064-5624/article/view/224678
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562416060259
- ID: 224678
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详细
A generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets of participants is proposed; this equilibrium turns out to be nonempty even in those cases where all known equilibria are empty.
作者简介
E. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow, 119991
