Generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with side interests of participants
- Авторы: Smol’yakov E.1
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Учреждения:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- Выпуск: Том 95, № 1 (2017)
- Страницы: 37-42
- Раздел: Mathematics
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1064-5624/article/view/224678
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562416060259
- ID: 224678
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Аннотация
A generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets of participants is proposed; this equilibrium turns out to be nonempty even in those cases where all known equilibria are empty.
Об авторах
E. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
Автор, ответственный за переписку.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Россия, Moscow, 119991