Enviar artigo por via de e-mail Generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with side interests of participants
- Autores: Smol’yakov E.1
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Afiliações:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- Edição: Volume 95, Nº 1 (2017)
- Páginas: 37-42
- Seção: Mathematics
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1064-5624/article/view/224678
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562416060259
- ID: 224678
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Resumo
A generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets of participants is proposed; this equilibrium turns out to be nonempty even in those cases where all known equilibria are empty.
Sobre autores
E. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Rússia, Moscow, 119991
