Email this article Generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with side interests of participants
- Authors: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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Affiliations:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- Issue: Vol 95, No 1 (2017)
- Pages: 37-42
- Section: Mathematics
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1064-5624/article/view/224678
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562416060259
- ID: 224678
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Abstract
A generalized equilibrium for conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets of participants is proposed; this equilibrium turns out to be nonempty even in those cases where all known equilibria are empty.
About the authors
E. R. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
Author for correspondence.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow, 119991
