卷 36, 编号 1 (2025)

The article was written in connection with the centenary of the outstanding Soviet philosopher Evald Vasilyevich Ilyenkov (1924–1979). It talks about the significance of Ilyenkov’s ideas in the history of philosophy, about his place within the framework of Marxist philosophy, the authentic form of which was developed in the Soviet Union by the school of dialectics, and then by the school of Ilyenkov. The main attention is paid to Ilyenkov’s ideas about man and consciousness. The idea of combining dialectical logic with human philosophy (philosophical anthropology) is proposed as promising. The role of the category “object” and the method of dividing the whole in the knowledge of a person and his individuality is emphasized. It is concluded that Ilyenkov revealed the well-known Marxian definition of the essence of man in accordance with the instructions of Marx himself as a concrete-universal concept that allows us to lay a philosophical foundation for the understanding of man as an active creative individuality. Ilyenkov’s ideas about consciousness are considered, and the prospects of the procedural understanding of consciousness and the approach to it as a double relationship to an object are discussed - an attitude to a relationship, a constantly renewed dimension of objective activity. Applied consequences from Ilyenkov’s interpretation of man and consciousness are noted. They relate, firstly, to Ilyenkov’s criticism of the constructivist style of thinking, which he designated by the term “positivist,” and which, despite the terminological appearance created, displaces science as knowledge of the laws of nature. Secondly, Ilyenkoym’s criticism of technocratic conceit, which, promising man a “consumer paradise” with the help of electronic civilization, naturally transformed into transhumanism, returning man from the freedom of social creativity to the order of biological evolution of species.

The article attempts to analyze the evolutionary significance of neotenic human traits using the example of two alternative research orientations: biological and sociobiological approaches. It is noted that a biological comparison of neotenic characteristics of humans and animals reveals a paradoxical correlation in terms of the adaptive mechanisms of natural selection, due to the changed relationship between the prolongation of the period of adulthood with its “superficial infantilism” and a slowdown in the time of formation of reproductive function. On this basis it is concluded that the biological meaning of neoteny which consists in adaptation to conditions that prevent the full-fledged existence of biologically immature individuals contradicted the species criteria of hominid evolution. The heuristic situation in which morphological signs of neoteny extend to the field of behavioral stereotypes of human looks fundamentally different. In this research context the hypothesis of D. Morris on the consequences of neoteny associated with nudity is critically analyzed. It is shown that in the context of the application of sociobiological research program actions that potentially targeted at members of different demographic groups are of particular interest. Based on the features of the considered paradigm a variant of the simultaneous action of two directions of biological and social evolution is proposed: the preservation of infantile traits that ensure the internal cohesion of the group while simultaneously consolidating other hierarchical differences. The general conclusion of the authors of the article is as follows. Neotenic human traits do not have an independent value as a biological constant independent of the conditions under which the process of individual and group selection took place. Evolutionary value of human neoteny was determined by a complex of acquired and inherited factors allowing us to reason about their primary or secondary, direct or indirect determination, and consequently, about the advantages of biological or sociobiological approaches.

The ways of solving two central problems of studying morality (the problem of defining morality and the problem of distinguishing the moral domain, or the sphere of morally significant phenomena) by american psychologist Jonathan Haidt are reconstructed and evaluated. The scientist warns against the use of normative and substantive definitions of morality in psychology, because their authors cannot overcome the bias towards value systems that have developed within the framework of Western culture over the past several centuries. J. Haidt considers the best definition of morality to be a functional one, treating morality as a set of “values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, technologies... psychological mechanisms” that serve to maintain co-operative communities. This definition of morality is accompanied by the expansion of the moral domain beyond the boundaries drawn by psychologists of the second half of the 20^th century and contemporary moral philosophers. The moral domain, for Haidt, includes not only those actions that are evaluated on the basis of the concepts of care/harm, fairness/cheating, freedom/oppression. He adds to the list of moral foundations such evaluative criteria as loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation. The author of this paper points out several reasons why Haidt’s concept of morality comes into question. Firstly, within the framework of Haidt’s methodology, the search for a definition of morality and the demarcation of the moral domain are not in a relationship of mutual correction. Secondly, the american psychologist distinguish the moral domain not on the basis of his own functional definition of morality, but on the basis of a standard set of its formal characteristics (objectivity, universality, overridingness). Thirdly, in his works, Haidt often operates with an implicit normative definition of morality, which shows the inevitability of its using.

The question of whether the imposition of collective moral responsibility can be a morally acceptable practice is considered. The author answers this question in the affirmative and suggests three conditions, the fulfillment of which is sufficient for the justified imposition of collective moral responsibility. These conditions are as follows: the existence of a group of agents that is capable to be an object of imposing collective responsibility and at the same time cannot be reduced to a mere aggregate of its members; the possession by this group of certain properties, abilities, inclinations or obligations that no member of this group, taken separately, possesses; the ability of the group to exercise reasonable joint control over the manifestations of some of its inclinations and the fulfillment of its obligations. Such ability allows a group to rationally resist the realization of some of its collective inclinations and thereby demonstrate the possession of certain normative attitudes. The possession of such attitudes justifies the ability of a group to bear collective moral responsibility for its collective actions. It is shown that the rejection of the practice of imposing collective moral responsibility, firstly, does not allow us to avoid cases of moral luck, and, secondly, leaves collective actions without moral consequences. At the same time, it is also shown that the imposition of collective moral responsibility does not require its distribution among the members of the group. The imposition of collective moral responsibility can be understood as a change in the attitude toward the group without changing the attitude toward any of its members.

This essay explores changes in the perception of reality and art in the digital age, where artificial intelligence and algorithmic processes form an integral part of our interaction with the media environment. The author introduces the concept of metasimulacrum, which represents a hybrid form of simulation that transcends classical notions of signs and their connection to reality. Metasimulacrum do not simply reproduce reality but actively transform it, altering the nature of symbols and meanings in the digital world. The author examines how metasimulacrum reshape creativity, turning it into a complex symbiosis of humans and technology, with algorithms acting as active co-creators that directly influence the final outcome. The essay discusses how human-algorithm interaction leads to changes in the creative process, making it more algorithmically defined and hybrid in nature.

Special attention is given to how digital information and technologies create a new environment for existence, which requires adaptation and reappropriation through bricolage. Bricolage serves as a method for appropriating and utilizing digital resources for survival and sustainable existence in this new informational element, where individuals must find new ways to adapt. The essay also addresses changes in perceptions of reality, symbols, and the uniqueness of the creative act in the context of posthumanism, where human and machine interaction creates hybrid forms of art. The focus lies on changes in the nature of symbols, meanings, and the perception of art as a democratic, accessible, and adaptive tool for engaging with the surrounding world, challenging traditional notions of the creative act and the uniqueness of an artwork.

The article examines three forms of nostalgia operating at the discursive level as tropes of metaphor, metonymy and allegory. The growth of metonymy and the decline of allegory, as well as the metaphorical reading of nostalgia, in the popular culture of the 2000s. indicate significant shifts in the historical imagination and public understanding of the past. The reasons for these processes are connected not so much with the conservative turn in public opinion in various countries, but with the general problem of mediatization, which relies on the widest possible audience of popular culture. Critical thinking is not in demand because it offers a “strong” theoretical program and requires significant cognitive effort. Nostalgia as a metonymy offers pleasure from spectacle and raising the status of viewers to “experts” solely through the recognition of visual images. It is concluded that allegory and metaphor will be in wide demand only if they find forms and strategies for interpreting film images that are more understandable to different parts of the audience. Contemporary popular culture reassembles the historical imagination, focusing on those social functions and practices that make the past “useful” to the audience — allowing them to mitigate the growing contradictions in the present and predict the future.

The article examines the problem of space in the philosophy of biopolitics of G. Agamben. Agamben’s analysis of the logic of space is important in the context of the spatial turn in humanities, including human geography and urban studies. At the center of the biopolitical concept is the connection between life and politics. Using the example of the first volume of Homo Sacer, a number of procedures are revealed and interpreted that define the connection between life and politics in ancient culture and in European culture of the 20th century. Explication and systematization of places of life allows us to identify the role of space in understanding the biopolitical techniques of population control. Particular attention is paid to the role of language, structural space, definition and further blurring of oppositions in Agamben’s analysis of space. To systematize the various definitions of space, “places of life” are distinguished as special forms of organizing the space of human life and politics: the place of the home (oikos) and the city (polis), the place of the camp, the place of the poetic gesture. Well-known concepts of Agamben’s philosophy play a role in shaping the relationships of these places: inclusive exclusion, zones of indiscernibility, suspension of differences. These relationships make it possible to describe places of life in their dynamics, unstable equilibrium, and to include into consideration the spatiotemporal deviations of these places and their topology. It was shown that the camp as a matrix of modern human life is determined by the special structural features of the organization of a person’s living space, the special “language” of space that shapes his attitude to politics and life. Along with the criticism of places, using the example of the space of poetic language, the possibility of a positive analysis of life in Agamben’s work is considered.