Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions


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This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.

Sobre autores

V. Topinskiy

Yandex LLC; Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School

Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: topinsky@gmail.com
Rússia, Moscow; Moscow

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