Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- Autores: Topinskiy V.A.1,2
- 
							Afiliações: 
							- Yandex LLC
- Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School
 
- Edição: Volume 78, Nº 1 (2017)
- Páginas: 180-196
- Seção: Large Scale Systems Control
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150529
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917010155
- ID: 150529
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Resumo
This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.
Sobre autores
V. Topinskiy
Yandex LLC; Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School
							Autor responsável pela correspondência
							Email: topinsky@gmail.com
				                					                																			                												                	Rússia, 							Moscow; Moscow						
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