Email this article Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- Authors: Topinskiy V.A.1,2
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Affiliations:
- Yandex LLC
- Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School
- Issue: Vol 78, No 1 (2017)
- Pages: 180-196
- Section: Large Scale Systems Control
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150529
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917010155
- ID: 150529
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Abstract
This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.
About the authors
V. A. Topinskiy
Yandex LLC; Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School
Author for correspondence.
Email: topinsky@gmail.com
Russian Federation, Moscow; Moscow
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