Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- 作者: Topinskiy V.A.1,2
- 
							隶属关系: 
							- Yandex LLC
- Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School
 
- 期: 卷 78, 编号 1 (2017)
- 页面: 180-196
- 栏目: Large Scale Systems Control
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150529
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917010155
- ID: 150529
如何引用文章
详细
This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.
作者简介
V. Topinskiy
Yandex LLC; Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic School
							编辑信件的主要联系方式.
							Email: topinsky@gmail.com
				                					                																			                												                	俄罗斯联邦, 							Moscow; Moscow						
补充文件
 
				
			 
						 
						 
					 
						 
						 
				 
  
  
  
  
  电邮这篇文章
			电邮这篇文章  开放存取
		                                开放存取 ##reader.subscriptionAccessGranted##
						##reader.subscriptionAccessGranted## 订阅存取
		                                		                                        订阅存取
		                                					