The independence of the judges in the governance of the judicial system

The study is aimed at improving the legal and organizational mechanisms that ensure the implementation of the constitutional principle of the independence of judges and the independence of the judiciary. The category of independence of judges is analyzed through the prism of administrative relations in the judicial system, as well as in relation to the level of political maturity of society. Real subjects, aims and tools of management of judges are identified, as well as gaps in the legislation on the status of judges, creating conditions for limiting their independence. The author substantiates the thesis that the problem of the independence of the judiciary rests not only in the question of the balance between external and internal governance, but in the relationship between the judiciary and society. The research methodology is based on the intersection of legal and management analysis. Its conceptual basis is the so-called management approach in law, the initial premise of which is the assertion of the absence of “pure” legal relations, if their participants are subjects that are elements of organizational systems (courts, law enforcement agencies, etc.). These relationships always deviate to some extent from the ideal goals, as set out in the law, towards the goals dictated by organizational effectiveness. The research is based on the empirical base: the data of judicial statistics, the results of sociological research, the data of the included observation — the author’s experience as a magistrate and Federal judge. The study concludes that the strengthening of the independence of judges can occur only with the joint action of the judicial community and civil society. Specific organizational and legal measures aimed at increasing the independence of judges are proposed.