Documents from the archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation on the position of African countries towards the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) and on the OAU’s peacemaking

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Abstract

On May 30, 1967 the southeastern provinces of Nigeria attempted to secede as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra. This caused the Nigerian civil war which lasted from July 6, 1967 to January 15, 1970. Biafran army was defeated and capitulated. The international response to the Nigerian crisis revealed an array of positions which were non-bloc, unique, and atypical of the Cold War era. The Soviet Union found out itself in a motley crew of Federal Government’s supporters – Great Britain, Eastern European socialist countries, Arab states. The United States declared neutrality. France, Portugal, the Republic of South Africa, the People’s Republic of China, and Israel were on Biafra’s side, both explicitly and implicitly. Document № 1 shows that the balance of geopolitical interests of the great powers was projected onto Africa. Most of African nations, mainly former British colonies, supported Nigeria’s territorial unity. Some countries sought an equidistant position. Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Zambia, and Tanzania officially recognized Biafra’s independence. Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon retained close ties with France and in their foreign policy followed the former metropolia. The leaders of Zambia and Tanzania have recognized Biafra under the influence of China, which has established itself as one of the key actors in Africa. Documents № 2 and № 3 contain information from the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia on the OAU’s attempts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Nigerian crisis. The OAU succeeded in securing the support of the overwhelming majority of African states for the retaining of Nigeria’s territorial integrity. The OAU’s mediation efforts failed to achieve peace. The Biafra leadership refused to capitulate as long as there were opportunities to resist and the federals was not going to bargain with separatists. The peace talks were used by both sides primarily for propaganda purposes.

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About the authors

S. V. Mazov

Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences

Author for correspondence.
Email: s.mazov@mail.ru
Scopus Author ID: 38661607200
ResearcherId: 0000-0001-6502-751X

главный научный сотрудник

Russian Federation, Moscow

References

  1. Mazov S.V. Voennaya pomosh SSSR federalnomu pravitelstvu vo vremya grazhdanskoyi voiny v Nigherii (1967–1970) [USSR Military Assistance to the Federal Government during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970)] // Novaya i Novejshaya Istoriya [Modern and Contemporary History]. 2023. № 4. S. 167–188. doi: 10.31857/S013038640027032–3 (In Russ.)
  2. Pilyatskin B. Nigherieiskyi uzel [A Nigerian knot] // Izvestiya [News]. 10.VI.1968. (In Russ.)
  3. Rossiya i Afrika. Dokumenty i materialy. 1961 — nachalo 1970-h [Russia and Africa. Documents and materials. 1961 — early 1970s] / pod red. A.S. Balezina, A.V. Voevodskogo, A.B. Davidsona, S.V. Mazova. Moskva, 2021. (In Russ.)
  4. Griffin Ch. France and the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970 // Postcolonial Conflict and the Question of Genocide: The Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967–1970 / eds A.D. Moses, L. Heerten. New York, 2017. P. 156–176.
  5. Jorre J. de St. The Brothers’ War. Biafra and Nigeria. Boston, 1972.
  6. Kirk-Greene A.H.M. Crisis and conflict in Nigeria: A documentary sourcebook 1966–1969. Vol. I–II. Oxford, 1971.

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