Enviar artigo por via de e-mail Spice-Models with Independent Agents
- Autores: Gorbaneva O.I.1
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Afiliações:
- Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences
- Edição: Volume 80, Nº 9 (2019)
- Páginas: 1745-1753
- Seção: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/151181
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919090145
- ID: 151181
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Resumo
In this paper, the models of social and private interests coordination engines (SPICE-models) with equal independent agents are studied. The existence and uniqueness of Nash and Pareto-optimal equilibria are proved. These equilibria satisfy resource monotonicity (RM) but not population monotonicity (PM) and anonymity (ANO). Also a result on the system compatibility of the model is established.
Sobre autores
O. Gorbaneva
Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: gorbaneva@mail.ru
Rússia, Rostov-on-Don
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