Spice-Models with Independent Agents
- 作者: Gorbaneva O.I.1
-
隶属关系:
- Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences
- 期: 卷 80, 编号 9 (2019)
- 页面: 1745-1753
- 栏目: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/151181
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919090145
- ID: 151181
如何引用文章
详细
In this paper, the models of social and private interests coordination engines (SPICE-models) with equal independent agents are studied. The existence and uniqueness of Nash and Pareto-optimal equilibria are proved. These equilibria satisfy resource monotonicity (RM) but not population monotonicity (PM) and anonymity (ANO). Also a result on the system compatibility of the model is established.
作者简介
O. Gorbaneva
Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: gorbaneva@mail.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Rostov-on-Don
补充文件
