Spice-Models with Independent Agents


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In this paper, the models of social and private interests coordination engines (SPICE-models) with equal independent agents are studied. The existence and uniqueness of Nash and Pareto-optimal equilibria are proved. These equilibria satisfy resource monotonicity (RM) but not population monotonicity (PM) and anonymity (ANO). Also a result on the system compatibility of the model is established.

作者简介

O. Gorbaneva

Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences

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Email: gorbaneva@mail.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Rostov-on-Don

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