Numerical Construction of Stackelberg Solutions in a Linear Positional Differential Game Based on the Method of Polyhedra
- Authors: Kuvshinov D.R.1,2, Osipov S.I.2
- 
							Affiliations: 
							- Krasovsky Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics
- Yeltsin Ural Federal University
 
- Issue: Vol 79, No 3 (2018)
- Pages: 479-491
- Section: Intellectual Control Systems, Data Analysis
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150827
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117918030074
- ID: 150827
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Abstract
We consider the problem of constructing approximate Stackelberg solutions in a linear non-zero-sum positional differential game of two players with terminal payoffs and player controls chosen on convex polyhedra. A formalization of player strategies and motions generated by them is based on the formalization and results of the theory of zero-sum positional differential games developed by N.N. Krasovskii and his scientific school. The problem of finding a Stackelberg solution reduces to solving nonstandard optimal control problems. We propose an approach based on operations with convex polyhedra.
About the authors
D. R. Kuvshinov
Krasovsky Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics; Yeltsin Ural Federal University
							Author for correspondence.
							Email: kuvshinovdr@yandex.ru
				                					                																			                												                	Russian Federation, 							Yekaterinburg; Yekaterinburg						
S. I. Osipov
Yeltsin Ural Federal University
														Email: kuvshinovdr@yandex.ru
				                					                																			                												                	Russian Federation, 							Yekaterinburg						
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