Numerical Construction of Stackelberg Solutions in a Linear Positional Differential Game Based on the Method of Polyhedra
- 作者: Kuvshinov D.R.1,2, Osipov S.I.2
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隶属关系:
- Krasovsky Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics
- Yeltsin Ural Federal University
- 期: 卷 79, 编号 3 (2018)
- 页面: 479-491
- 栏目: Intellectual Control Systems, Data Analysis
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150827
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117918030074
- ID: 150827
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详细
We consider the problem of constructing approximate Stackelberg solutions in a linear non-zero-sum positional differential game of two players with terminal payoffs and player controls chosen on convex polyhedra. A formalization of player strategies and motions generated by them is based on the formalization and results of the theory of zero-sum positional differential games developed by N.N. Krasovskii and his scientific school. The problem of finding a Stackelberg solution reduces to solving nonstandard optimal control problems. We propose an approach based on operations with convex polyhedra.
作者简介
D. Kuvshinov
Krasovsky Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics; Yeltsin Ural Federal University
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: kuvshinovdr@yandex.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Yekaterinburg; Yekaterinburg
S. Osipov
Yeltsin Ural Federal University
Email: kuvshinovdr@yandex.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Yekaterinburg
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