Bidding Models and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: A Survey


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Resumo

Using a simplified multistage bidding model with asymmetrically informed agents, De Meyer and Saley [17] demonstrated an idea of endogenous origin of the Brownian component in the evolution of prices on stock markets: random price fluctuations may be caused by strategic randomization of “insiders.” The model is reduced to a repeated game with incomplete information. This paper presents a survey of numerous researches inspired by the pioneering publication of De Meyer and Saley.

Sobre autores

V. Kreps

National Research University Higher School of Economics; St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics

Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: vita_kreps@mail.ru
Rússia, St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg

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