Мақаланы E-mail арқылы жіберу Bidding Models and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: A Survey
- Авторлар: Kreps V.L.1,2
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Мекемелер:
- National Research University Higher School of Economics
- St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics
- Шығарылым: Том 80, № 2 (2019)
- Беттер: 362-379
- Бөлім: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/151305
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919020139
- ID: 151305
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Аннотация
Using a simplified multistage bidding model with asymmetrically informed agents, De Meyer and Saley [17] demonstrated an idea of endogenous origin of the Brownian component in the evolution of prices on stock markets: random price fluctuations may be caused by strategic randomization of “insiders.” The model is reduced to a repeated game with incomplete information. This paper presents a survey of numerous researches inspired by the pioneering publication of De Meyer and Saley.
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Авторлар туралы
V. Kreps
National Research University Higher School of Economics; St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics
Хат алмасуға жауапты Автор.
Email: vita_kreps@mail.ru
Ресей, St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg
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