No 5 (2023)

The article is devoted to the distribution of possessions, mainly cities of the Russian state at the beginning of the XVI century, between the five sons of Ivan III (Vasily, the future Vasily III, his brothers Yuri, Semyon, Dmitry and Andrei, born in the marriage of Ivan III with the Greek Princess Sophia Palaiologos). This distribution was fixed by a will ("spiritual letter") Ivan III, composed in 1503. In historical science, both domestic and foreign, this testament has clearly not been studied enough, although the first publication of this document dates back to 1788. The source was already known to N. M. Karamzin. S.M. Solovyov pointed out that the will mentioned 66 cities that Ivan III had bequeathed to his eldest son Vasily and 30 cities bequeathed to 4 younger brothers of Vasily, taken together. Where the historian got these figures from, he did not explain. Nevertheless, V.O. Klyuchevsky used them to show how much the material possibilities of Ivan III's eldest son Vasily had grown. In Soviet times, the will of Ivan III was often quoted, but in general it was never studied. An appeal to this source showed that it does not refer to 66 cities that were tied to the future Vasily III, but at least 95. His younger brothers in total received not 30 cities, but 26 and half of another 1 city. Ivan III's successor Vasily eventually received more than 78% of all cities in the Russian state, his four brothers - less than 22%. At the same time, the younger sons of Ivan III were forbidden to expand their possessions, they became precarious, and Vasily III received the right to deprive his brothers of their inheritance if they schemed against him. The immediate result of these innovations was the cessation of the internal dynastic struggle in the Russian state among the Moscow Rurikovich.

The article provides an overview of the activities of the Minister of Finance of the Russian Empire I.A. Vyshnegradsky aimed at overcoming the consequences of crop failures of 1891-1892 and the disorder of public finances. Such measures as the allocation of significant funds for the purchase of bread for the starving population, the reduction of railway tariffs for the transportation of goods to the affected provinces, the provision of benefits to borrowers of state-owned credit institutions, the prohibition of grain exports abroad, the organization and conduct of public works, the additional issue of credit cards to fill the channels of monetary circulation, the conclusion of an external "golden" loan, limiting departmental spending in order to reduce the budget deficit, stop the fall of the ruble and Russian securities. It is concluded that, despite some shortcomings and failures of anti-crisis policy, government measures have played a significant role in the fight against hunger.

There is an opinion about the exclusively technical functions of the State Planning Committee in historiography. However, this institution played a significant role in the development of economic policy strategies and its implementation. Using the example of the conversion of the military industry in 1945-1950. the role of the State Planning Committee is shown as an important element of the state system. He was not a conductor of the decisions of the Stalinist leadership, but took an independent position on carrying out the conversion and limited the “opportunism” of the military-industrial departments. The determining factor was the personality of N.I. Voznesensky. Throughout the 1940s. he was a member of the leadership of all senior structures involved in economic management. The influence of the State Planning Committee on political decision-making was directly related to the career growth and strengthening of the administrative weight of its leader.

The article is devoted to the crucial developmental stages of the magazine «Crocodile» in the post-war years. At the end of the 1940s, the magazine, which replicated cartoons, proved to be a popular tool in the conditions of the aggravated confrontation of the former allies. The material and organizational improvement of the magazine's work led to an improvement in the situation of cartoonists, whose status turned out to be close to the status of the nomenclature. At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, the magazine entered a phase of crisis associated with both the peculiarity of the domestic and foreign policy situation, and with the processes that took place inside the cartoonists' workshop. The author concludes that the crisis phenomena in the Soviet agitprop, expressed in the gradual physical and moral decrepitude of the propaganda apparatus, led to the fact that the cartoon ceased to act as an effective tool of influence on public consciousness.

Based on archival documents, the article traces the key moments of the long-term process of preparing Soviet athletes for the 1952 Olympic Games. Thanks to the course of the party and state leadership of the country to use the possibilities of cultural diplomacy after the end of the Second World War, Soviet sports come out of isolation, actively use bilateral sports contacts and participate in some World and European Championships. The entry of the Soviet Union into the Olympic movement was hampered by the atychiphobia of Soviet leaders and top sports functionaries, when a defeat in any international competition was seen as damage to the prestige of the USSR. Only in December 1951, the authorities, convinced of the ability of the Soviet Union to compete with the United States for Olympic leadership, agreed to participate in the Olympic Games in Helsinki.