Vol 2, No 4 (2021)

The article proposes a reconstruction of the Kunstlehre concept, which occupies an important place in the structural and disciplinary section of Husserl'sphenomenology. The key point of the presented reconstruction is its separation from the traditional interpretation of Kunstlehre criticized by Husserl and the advancement of a new project that coordinates three levels – theoretical, normative and practical. The theoretical level (pure logic), being complementary to the normative level (pure norms of reason), forms the basis of the disciplines represented by the program of science of knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre). The scientific study program falls on the period of the so- called logicism of Husserl, regarding which there is an opinion in the research literature that it was interrupted by the founder of phenomenology immediately after the writing of the first volume of “Logical Investigations”. However, on the basis of textual arguments, weshow that this program was extended by Husserlup to his last works. The nature of this expansion is related to the practical level of Kunstlehre (transcendental phenomenology). The main task of this level was to provide science and scientists with noetic conditions, i.e. skills of transcendental criticism of consciousness. It is suggested that the presented reconstruction of Kunstlehre shows the permanent development of the program of logicism by Husserl, and also demonstrates the connection of this program with transcendental phenomenology.

The formalization of the principle of knowability suggested by Dorothy Edgington is examined. This formalization has been suggested as a solution to the Fitch problem. It is interesting in that it blocks the Fitch argument and, in informal reading, makes a clear and intuitively appealing sense. On the other hand, as is shown in the paper, the semantic theory behind this formalization has two significant gaps: 1) it does not define the interpretation of actuality operator, and 2) it does not define the semantic way of representing the agent’sknowledge. The main outcome of the papers is critical. It is to the effect that unless those gaps are filled, Edgington’stheory cannot count as a solution to the Fitch problem.

The relevance of the research topic is determined by the variety of speculative interpretations of the concept of utility, as a rule, unrelated to the scope of ideas about their practical application. In the context of solving the problem of the interrelation of theoretical and practical aspects of the concept of utility, an overview of the ways of its definition in the work of C.S. Pierce is given. The prerequisites for the emergence of a synthetic understanding of the utility are considered. A critique of the political economic and utilitarian teachings is undertaken, in which the utility is understood as: 1) the ability of a good or commodity to satisfy any human need; 2) the guiding principle for the pursuit of social happiness. As a conclusion, attention is drawn to the actual Peirce definition of utility, consistent with the "unity of apperception", according to which something is recognized as useful (or possessing it) if, when exposed to a thinking being, it causes a reaction consistent with the expected consequences from it.

The article annuls the role of practice in the development of mathematics in the 19th century in the formation of mathematical logic. It is shown that the revolutionary transformations of mathematics of the 19th century, which led to an increase in the abstractness of mathematical theories and concepts, was accompanied by an increase in uncertainty regarding the standards of proof, which led to the universal spread of anxiety (J. Gray) as an element of mathematical practice. It is argued that this element of practice was one of the sources of the emergence of mathematical logic, which claims to give rigor and accuracy to mathematics. The article argues that the socio- epistemological analysis of the practice of mathematics and the formation of mathematical logic will clarify the specifics of the development of relations between mathematics and mathematical logic.

The article examines various types and tools of scientific communication: from traditional ones that have existed for several centuries, to completely new ones that have arisen in connection with the development of information technologies and the global Internet space. In order to show the differences between the new communication tools and those that existed earlier, the author gives a brief historical overview of the development of scientific communication since the emergence of Respublica Literaria in the 15th century until the emergence of networked scientific communities at the beginning of the XXI century. As a result of the study, it was found that the development of network scientific communities is a response to the crisis of traditional primary communication tools and provides the scientist with a new space for creativity and scientific research.