The evolution of the concept of central bank communication as a tool: from a threat to financial stability to an element of the economic security system
- Authors: Koshkin A.V.1, Pen'kova I.V.1
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Affiliations:
- Issue: No 5 (2025)
- Pages: 1-15
- Section: Articles
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/2454-0668/article/view/358159
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0668.2025.5.76466
- EDN: https://elibrary.ru/FCQQMK
- ID: 358159
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Abstract
The subject of this research is the evolution of communication policy of central banks as a key tool of monetary regulation. The work traces the fundamental transformation of the role of communication: from the historical doctrine of secrecy, where it was considered a potential threat to financial stability, through its recognition as a routine mechanism for managing inflation expectations, to its modern affirmation as a strategic element of the state's economic security system. The analysis focuses on the shift in theoretical paradigms influenced by the development of economic thought (from the theory of time-inconsistency to the theory of inflation targeting), as well as specific discursive practices and verbal interventions of central banks (using examples from the US Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of Russia) during periods of financial stability and systemic crises. The research shows how communication has transformed from an optional addition into an independent channel of the transmission mechanism, directly influencing financial sovereignty. The study employs a range of qualitative methods: historical-genetic analysis to reconstruct the evolution of the paradigm, discourse analysis of key verbal interventions, comparative analysis of practices across different jurisdictions, and an institutional approach to interpret the results. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the systematic justification of the transition of central bank communication into the category of elements of national economic security. A key conclusion is the assertion of the performative nature of modern monetary communication: in times of crisis, verbal intervention not only describes reality but actively constructs it, serving as an independent tool for stabilization and preventing a collapse of trust. The research identifies and analyzes the "transparency paradox," whereby the pursuit of maximum clarity generates risks of excessive dependence of markets on communication signals. Using the example of the Bank of Russia in 2022, the study details how the deliberate construction of narratives (the temporariness of the shock, resource adequacy, and guarantees of support) functions to preemptively suppress panic, directly relating to the goals of ensuring financial sovereignty and stability.
About the authors
Andrei Vyacheslavovich Koshkin
Email: koshkin_9300@mail.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9942-7722
Inessa Vyacheslavovna Pen'kova
Email: penkova_iv@spbstu.ru
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