Russian versions of measures for assessing core knowledge confusions and bullshit receptivity: Adaptation and validation

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Abstract

In the context of information overload and the spread of disinformation, the ability to discern truth and meaning becomes especially important. This study focuses on two reasoning errors — ontological confusion and receptivity to bullshit — that influence the formation of beliefs. The aim of the study was to adapt and validate Russian-language versions of two measurement instruments: Core Knowledge Confusions Scale developed by M. Lindeman and K. Aarnio, which assesses the ability to correctly distinguish between different ontological categories (such as physical objects, mental phenomena, and biological entities), and Bullshit Receptivity Scale created by A. Erlandsson and colleagues, which measures receptivity to pseudo-profound statements lacking real content. Their associations with cognitive abilities, motivational factors, and personality traits were examined. To ensure cultural appropriateness of the items, cognitive interviews were conducted. The study involved 1,268 respondents. Data analysis using Item Response Theory models and multiple regression demonstrated the reliability and validity of both instruments in the Russian context. The results revealed that core knowledge confusions were positively associated with receptivity to bullshit, as well as with belief in the paranormal and pseudoscientific claims. Verbal intelligence negatively predicted both reasoning errors, whereas extraversion was a positive predictor. Need for structure was positively related to core knowledge confusions, while need for meaning was positively related to receptivity to bullshit. Among sociodemographic factors, educational level was negatively associated with core knowledge confusions, whereas older age and male gender were negatively associated with receptivity to bullshit. These findings highlight the significant role of cognitive and motivational factors in information processing and belief formation, and may have practical implications for developing educational strategies aimed at enhancing critical thinking and information literacy.

About the authors

Elizaveta Shamilevna Komyaginskaya

HSE University

Author for correspondence.
Email: ekomyaginskaya@hse.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8841-1722
SPIN-code: 4854-0374
ResearcherId: HII-5216-2022

Research Intern, Center for Sociocultural Research

20 Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Albina Alikovna Gallyamova

HSE University

Email: aagallyamova@hse.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8775-7289
SPIN-code: 6639-2529
Scopus Author ID: 58182813400
ResearcherId: GLV-6876-2022

Junior Research Fellow, Center for Sociocultural Research

20 Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Anna Yur'evna Ocheret

HSE University

Email: ayuocheret@edu.hse.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0000-6540-5322
ResearcherId: JPL-1952-2023

Student, Faculty of Social Sciences

20 Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Dmitry Sergeevich Grigoryev

HSE University

Email: dgrigoryev@hse.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-4511-7942
SPIN-code: 1807-9739
Scopus Author ID: 57191706675
ResearcherId: K-3338-2015

PhD, Research Fellow, Center for Sociocultural Research

20 Myasnitskaya St, Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

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