The Dual Aspects of Legal Reasoning in the Era of Artificial Intelligence - Defeasible Reasoning and Argumentation Scheme

Cover Page

Cite item

Full Text

Abstract

The age of artificial intelligence emphasises the possibility of justification and the dialectical aspects of legal reasoning. The need for validity in legal reasoning mainly stems from the existence of exceptions to rules and conflicts between rules. Formal logic may well account for exceptions to rules and thus characterise cancellable reasoning. The presented article focuses on legal issues related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) that are being discussed in the scientific community because of their importance for understanding the mechanisms of law realisation. Some of the most pressing issues in the application of artificial intelligence include: transparency of algorithms, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, unfairness, bias and discrimination, lack of adversariality, legal personality issues, intellectual property issues, adverse effects on employees, privacy and data protection issues, liability for damages and lack of liability. Recognising the importance of artificial intelligence in the field of law, and acknowledging that the field requires constant reassessment and flexibility, this article develops a discussion that is important given the seriousness of the impact of artificial intelligence technologies on legal actors. on legal issues related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) that are being discussed in the scientific community because of their importance for understanding the mechanisms of law realisation. Some of the most pressing issues in the application of artificial intelligence include: transparency of algorithms, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, unfairness, bias and discrimination, lack of adversariality, legal personality issues, intellectual property issues, adverse effects on employees, privacy and data protection issues, liability for damages and lack of liability. Recognising the importance of artificial intelligence in the field of law, and acknowledging that the field requires constant reassessment and flexibility, this article develops a discussion that is important given the seriousness of the impact of artificial intelligence technologies on legal actors.

About the authors

Ze Li

Shanghai University of Political Science and Law

Email: strawberry7576@hotmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0815-8537

Doctor of Law, Associate Professor of the School of Law

Shanghai, China

Feiping Lei

Shanghai University of Political Science and Law

Email: leifeiping1997@163.com
ORCID iD: 0009-0005-3934-0605

PhD student

Shanghai, China

Dmitry N. Ermakov

RUDN University

Author for correspondence.
Email: ermakov-dn@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0811-0058
SPIN-code: 6835-3155

Doctor of Economics, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of the Department of Innovation Management in Industries, Engineering Academy

Moscow, Russia

Nina V. Symaniuk

Ural Federal University

Email: n.v.symaniuk@urfu.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8446-857X
SPIN-code: 6130-5695

Associate Professor, Department of Public Law, Graduate School of Economics and Management

Ekaterinburg, Russia

Ilya V. Poletaev

RUDN University

Email: 1142220172@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3767-6659
SPIN-code: 1110-4456

PhD student of the Department of Innovation Management and Foreign Economic Activity in Industry, Graduate School of Industrial Policy and Entrepreneurship

Moscow, Russia

Naofal M.H. Aziz

RUDN University

Email: 1042208064@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0004-5014-6195

PhD student of the Department of Innovation Management in Industries of the Engineering Academy

Moscow, Russia

Ahmed Obaid

RUDN University

Email: 1042218171@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0001-1556-6985

PhD student of the Department of Innovation Management in Industries of the Engineering Academy

Moscow, Russia

Pavel I. Ivanov

RUDN University

Email: 1142220389@rudn.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0002-5456-6934

PhD student of the Department of Innovation Management in Industries of the Engineering Academy

Moscow, Russia

References

  1. Buchanan BG, Headrick TE. Some Speculation about Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning. Stanford Law Review; 1970.
  2. Lodder AR. Dialaw: On Legal Justification and Dialogical Models of Argumentation. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publ.; 1999.
  3. Reiter R. A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence. 1980;13(1-2):81-132.
  4. Prakken H, Sartor G. Modeling Reasoning with Precedents in a Formal Dialogue Game. Artificial Intelligence and Law. 1998;6(2). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:10082783 09945
  5. Gardner A. von der L. An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning. MIT Press; 1987. Available from: https://archive.org/details/artificialintell00vond (accessed: 14.09.2023).
  6. Taruffo M. Judicial Decisions and Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence and Law. 2004;6:311-324 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008230426783
  7. Hage J. Studies in legal logic. Springer; 2005.
  8. Pollock JL. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton University Press; 1972.
  9. Pollock JL. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton University Press; 1974.
  10. Alchourron С, Gardenfors P, Makinsn D. On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic. 1985;50(2): 510-530. https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239
  11. Alexy R. Book Review of Logical Tools for Modelling legal Argument. Argumentation. 2000;14:66-72.
  12. Sartor G. Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning. In: Bankowski Z, White I, Hahn U (eds.) Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning. Law and Philosophy Library, (vol. 21). Dordrecht: Springer. 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8531-6_4
  13. Swet AS. The judicial construction of Europe. Oxford University Press; 2004.
  14. De Mat E, Winkels R, Van Engers T. Automated detection of reference structures in law. IOS Press; 2006.
  15. Katzav J, Reed C. A Classification System for Arguments. University of Dundee, Scotland UK, 2010.
  16. Prakken H, AI & Law. Logic and Argument Schemes. Argumentation. 2005;19:303-320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-005-4418-7
  17. Sartor G. Legal Reasoning: A Cognitive Approach to the Law. Heidelberg: Springer; 2005.
  18. Walton D, Sartor G. Teleological Justification of Argumentation Schemes. Argumentation. 2003;27:111-142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9262-y
  19. Pinto RC. Evaluating Inferences: The Nature and Role of Warrants. Arguing on the Toulmin Model. Hitchcock D., Verheij B. (eds.) Dordrech: Springer Publ.; 2006;10:115-143. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_9
  20. Garcia A.J., Simari G.R. Defeasible logic programming: an argumentative approach. Theory and practice of logic programming. 2004. p. 95-136.
  21. Sovrano F, Sapienza S, Palmirani M, Vitali F. Metrics, Explainability and the European AI Act Proposal. J - Multidisciplinary Scientific Journal. 2022;5(1):126-138. https://doi.org/10.3390/j5010010
  22. Pagallo U, Durante M. The Good, the Bad, and the Invisible with Its Opportunity Costs: Introduction to the ‘J’ Special Issue on “the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Law”. J - Multidisciplinary Scientific Journal. 2022;5(1):139-149. https://doi.org/10.3390/j5010011
  23. Casanovas P, de Koker L, Hashmi M. Law, SocioLegal Governance, the Internet of Things, and Industry 4.0: A Middle-Out/Inside-Out Approach. J - Multidisciplinary Scientific Journal. 2022;5(1):64-91. https://doi.org/10.3390/j5010005
  24. Bentzen B, Liao B, Liga D, Markovich R, Wei B, Xiong M, Xu T (eds.) Logics for AI and Law. Joint Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Logics for New-Generation Artifi cial Intelligence and the International Workshop on Logic, AI and Law. September 8-9 and 11-12, 2023. Hangzhou: College Publications Publ.; 2023.

Supplementary files

Supplementary Files
Action
1. JATS XML

Согласие на обработку персональных данных

 

Используя сайт https://journals.rcsi.science, я (далее – «Пользователь» или «Субъект персональных данных») даю согласие на обработку персональных данных на этом сайте (текст Согласия) и на обработку персональных данных с помощью сервиса «Яндекс.Метрика» (текст Согласия).