The «British way» of counterinsurgency struggle: RAND, decolonization and «emergency» in Malaya (1948-1960)

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This paper discusses the state of emergency imposed by the British in Malaya. The work in Malaya is based on the analytical work of the American RAND Corporation members. The Malaya conflict is successful for the British in the field of colonial knowledge. That is why the conflict was carefully studied by the RAND Corporation as a model of counter-insurgency; therefore, we can see the interest of the United States to the analysis and methods of struggle against the rebel movement before the era of the Vietnam conflict. Of course, RAND worked for the US government, i.e. the Ministry of defense has signed contracts with this Corporation. The United States will try to practice certain methods of fighting guerrillas in Vietnam, but it is worth considering that each conflict is individual. The paper shows the Communist movement evolution in Malaya - from the inception to the victory of the British and the gradual disappearance of the rebel movement. The conflict was successful for the UK, as the main population of Malaya was not interested in the departure of the British; the local elite supported the British crown. The paper demonstrates features of the Malay conflict.

About the authors

Alexander Ivanovich Lyozin

Samara State University of Social Sciences and Education

Email: lezin1995@gmail.com

student of History Faculty

Russian Federation, Samara

Dmitriy Alexandrovich Nesterov

Samara State University of Social Sciences and Education

Author for correspondence.
Email: dmitriynesterov1994@gmail.com

master student of World History, Law and Methods of Teaching Department

Russian Federation, Samara

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