An approach TO COMPARe ORGANIZATION MODES OF ACTIVE AGENTS and CONTROL METHODS
- Authors: Ougolnitsky G.A1
-
Affiliations:
- Southern Federal University
- Issue: No 3 (2022)
- Pages: 29-39
- Section: Control in Social and Economic Systems
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1819-3161/article/view/350863
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.25728/pu.2022.3.3
- ID: 350863
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Abstract
When interacting, active agents can behave independently, cooperate, or have hierarchical relations. In turn, a hierarchical impact may be exerted by administrative or economic methods with or without feedback. These organizational modes and control methods are systematically described based on game-theoretic models with different information structures without uncertainty. It seems crucial to compare the payoffs of separate agents quantitatively with social welfare under the organization modes and control methods. A methodology is proposed to build the systems of social and individual preferences in normal form games and determine shares when allocating the cooperative payoff. A system of relative efficiency indices is developed for detailed quantitative assessment. This methodology is illustrated by several Cournot oligopoly models.
About the authors
G. A Ougolnitsky
Southern Federal University
Author for correspondence.
Email: gaugolnickiy@sfedu.ru
Rostov-on-Don, Russia
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