Mind and brain: what is the connection? Clinical and philosophical aspects

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Abstract

The analytical review touches on clinical, neurobiological and philosophical problems of the relationship between brain and mind. With regard to the needs of clinical practice, the ontological aspects of consciousness and free will are considered, and some theoretical models of behavioral psychopathology are analyzed. A conclusion is made about the priority in psychiatry of the neurobiological paradigm while maintaining interest in modern forms of interactionist and property dualism.

About the authors

Mikhail L. Zobin

Centre of transformational therapy of addictions

Author for correspondence.
Email: doctor.zobin@gmail.com
Montenegro, 85330, Kotor, Dobrota BB

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