Slavânovedenie

The article is devoted to the little-studied problems of the history of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 – the military and political strategy of the top leadership of the Russian Empire and the commander-in-Chief of the 1st Army, General-in-Chief Prince A. M. Golitsyn towards the Principality of Moldavia in the initial period of the conflict, during the campaign of 1769. Flaws in the organization of strategic planning on the Russian side, the absence of a pre-developed war plan, deficiencies in the supply system of troops and the inability to use an artillery siege park significantly limited the effectiveness of Golitsyn’s operations on the upper Dniester, which was reflected in two unsuccessful attempts by the Russian army to take the fortress of Khotyn in April and July 1769. For political and psychological reasons, this undermined Golitsyn’s credibility at the imperial court and led to his removal from the post of commander-in-chief, however, it was Golitsyn’s pragmatic defensive strategy that allowed him to defeat the main forces of the Ottoman army in late August – early September 1769 and force them to retreat from most of the territory of Moldova. Simultaneously with the conduct of military operations, A. M. Golitsyn and the commander of the vanguard corps of the 1st Army, Major General Prince A. A. Prozorovsky actively engaged, largely on their own initiative, in establishing secret intelligence and political contacts with representatives of the highest boyars and clergy of Moldova. Their success in this activity, as well as the recruitment of Arnaut formations from local natives to the Russian service, largely paved the way for the rapid and successful occupation of most of Moldavia by Russian troops in the autumn of 1769.

The article is based on previously little-known archival material, mostly on the official correspondence of the Russian command.

The article aims to discern the contents and specifics of the French estimates in regard of the Czechoslovakian role in the interactions between the Third Republic and the Soviet Russia/USSR in 1920–1924. Chiefly, the author analyses the French answers on the question about the significance and potential function of Czechoslovakia in the interstate triangle. Rather recently published French diplomatic documents are used as sources, as well as the evidence taken from the Diplomatic archives of the French Ministry of Europe and foreign affairs, and the from funds of the Historical services of the French Ministry of Armed forces. The author concludes that Paris contemplated two main roles of Prague in the triangle USSR – Czechoslovakian Republic – France. First, Czechoslovakia could be an important element of the «sanitary cordon» directed against Germany and the Soviets; second, she could perform the function of a potential bridge in the case of Franco-Soviet normalisation. Such roles of Czechoslovakia were not antagonistic, and Paris tried to combine them in the French foreign policy and strategy. The variety of international, regional and interior circumstances defined what role was emphasised by the leadership of the Third Republic. In 1919–1921, 1923, when the Soviet-French contradictions were sharp and Paris underlined the «Soviet menace», the right governments of France tended to think about Czechoslovakia more as an important element of the «sanitary cordon», though understanding that the latter wasn’t really solid. On the contrary, in 1922 and from end of 1923, while the interest of France in normalising the relations with the Soviets grew stronger, the role of Czechoslovakia as a potential bridge to USSR attracted more attention of the Paris (these aspirations remained unfulfilled). Though the French estimates were volatile and depended on person, the images of the russophilia of the Czechoslovakian society, and the thesis that antagonism Czechoslovakia and USSR couldn’t escalated to war, persisted.

The Munich Agreement had a profound effect on the national-territorial conflict between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The first Vienna Award on November 2, 1938 resolved it in favor of Hungary. The consequences of the arbitration created a new configuration in the territorial dispute between autonomous Slovakia within the Second Republic and Hungary, involving Poland as well. Warsaw sought to obtain a joint Polish-Hungarian border, which led to the events of November 1938 – the Polish operation «Lom» in Transcarpathia failed, but local battles in the areas of Čadca and Javorina ended with the last adjustment of the post-Munich delimitation in favor of Poland. Since January 1939 incidents began on the Slovak-Hungarian border. In view of the threat of dismemberment of Slovakia on March 14, it declared independence. Hungary occupied Carpatho-Ukraine and then unleashed the «Small War» (March 23–31). Hungary received 1,050 sq. km with a population of 40 thousand people, half of whom were Slovaks. Slovak-Hungarian relations acquired a hostile character. Germany made the conflict between the two countries the subject of political blackmail, which was one of the reasons for their joining the fascist «axis».

The paper discusses the linguistic competence of members of a mixed Czech-Croatian-Bolivian family living in western Slavonia. Language competence in Croatian, Czech and Spanish is analyzed. Czech is used within the Czech minority, Spanish is used by a native of Bolivia with Croatian roots. The models of loanwords adaptation of Croatian items in the Spanish and Czech speech of interlocutors, as well as the adaptation of Czech items in Croatian language are analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the linguistic characteristics of the native idioms of the informants: the Bolivian version of Spanish and the Croatian version of Czech. Statistical methods are used to identify the frequency of functioning of individual borrowed items. It is stated that the degree of penetration of L2 items into L1 depends not only on the genetic affinity of the languages, but also on the time of their acquisition and on the frequency of use. The case under consideration is unique for this region and allows us to find out the mechanisms of using three languages at the micro level.

Based on archival materials, the article analyzes the international context in which the project of establishing the Institute of Slavic studies in the USSR, drawn up in the Soviet mission in Prague in 1926, appeared. The Institute was supposed to train specialists for work in the Slavic states and conduct research in various fields of Slavic studies. The documents of the mission show that the foundation of the Institute of Slavic studies was one of the initial stages in the extensive program for the development of broad scientific and cultural relations of the USSR with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Poland. According to the plan of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Czechoslovakia Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko and the head of the press bureau of the mission Roman O. Jakobson, the implementation of this program would have helped to increase the effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy towards the Slavic states.