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Vol 34, No 3 (2023)
The philosophy of the himan being
The Culture of Guilt and the Responsibility of the Physician when Using Clinical Decision Support System
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to substantiate the need to revise the structure of moral and criminal responsibility of the physician in a social system in which a culture of guilt is imposed on him, that is, sole personal responsibility for any medical error committed, including with the participation of the clinical decision support system. From the paternalistic model of the «doctor-patient» relationship, since the 1970s, there has been a transition to a model of collaborative responsible behavior, in which each party is obligated to know and understand the nature of clinical decisions, which must also be supported by a special form of informed consent for both patient and physician, if AI technologies are included in diagnostic and treatment procedures. At the same time, in fact, there is no clear regulation of the process of communication and work with information, as well as the personal responsibility of top management for the formation of a medical support system. Because of the fundamental opaqueness of the operation of constantly developing artificial intelligence technologies (using neural networks as an example), the final decision must remain with the physician. However, justification of his responsibility in the new technological conditions requires a new social contract within the professional environment regarding the conditions for implementing clinical decision support system into broad medical practice.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):9-23
9-23
J. Savulescu's "The God Machine" as a Moral Agent and the Problem of Responsibility
Abstract
This article is devoted to the issue of moral responsibility in connection with artificial intelligence technologies. In recent years, artificial intelligence has been actively developing towards greater autonomy, which makes the philosophical analysis of artificial moral agency extremely relevant. The relevance of the work is also determined by the increasing spread of artificial intelligence in professional areas, including those related to the adoption of responsible managerial, financial, etc. solutions. The main object of research in the article is a thought experiment — the project of the so-called “The God Machine” by the Western philosopher J. Savulescu, which allows us to turn to such an important aspect as the possibility of the influence of artificial intelligence on the development of human moral consciousness, since modern technologies, along with projects of biological moral human enhancement, claim the ability to create artificial moral agents. The authors give a comprehensive analysis of this project, correlating it with other concepts of modern analytical philosophy of consciousness, incl. Н. Frankfurt. The theoretical focus of the study is directed to the concepts of responsibility and freedom as key in formulating the criteria of moral agency. At the same time, the article considers the features of the implementation of the criteria of moral agency in relation to artificial intelligence. The article assesses the viability of J. Savulescu's project, in particular: to what extent artificial intelligence like the The God Machine can be considered as a moral agent, whether a person can acquire the characteristics of a moral, responsible and free person with the help of such an artificial mediator, and to what extent such projects contribute to the moral enhancement of mankind. It also points to the risks of paternalistic interference in the development of morality. Separately, the phenomenon of moral dilemmas is considered in connection with the problems of embedding artificial intelligence in the life of modern society, as well as the logical aspects of decision-making in the context of moral conflicts. The conclusion is formulated about the key importance of the category of responsibility for modeling the relationship between man and artificial intelligence in machine ethics.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):24-40
24-40
Scientific research
Moral Responsibility of a Moral Agent: Descriptive and Normative Approaches
Abstract
The problem of moral responsibility occupies a key place in modern ethical studies. Based on the discussions formed in the academic field, the article considers the features of two main approaches to the definition of moral responsibility and the conditions for its onset: descriptive and normative. It is shown that despite the fact that the descriptive approach aspires for objectivity of imputation and ascription of moral responsibility, regardless of the specification of substantive moral requirements, it is still insufficient to explain the characterization of responsibility as moral. Therefore, the descriptive approach must necessarily be supplemented by a normative approach, so it becomes possible to define a moral agent not just as an object of responsibility, but also as an actor with the property of being morally responsible. The key to resolving the issue of different approaches to moral responsibility is to consider the concepts of strict and zero responsibility as specific conditions for imputing responsibility to an agent, which are impossible within the framework of an exclusively descriptive approach. It is shown that from an ethical perspective, these types of legal responsibility “without fault” imply normative attitudes towards actors who are considered as full-fledged moral agents. The ethical analysis of strict and zero responsibility demonstrates the conditions for the positive moral responsibility within the framework of the normative approach, namely the desire to maintain a normative order focused on maintaining the “good life”. The combined use of descriptive and normative approaches with simultaneous reference to the moral agent's own characteristics makes it possible to clarify the features of moral responsibility.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):41-59
41-59
Homo Academicus as a Bearer of Responsibility
Abstract
The authors explore the problem of scientists’ and scholars’ responsibility for the emergence, development, achievements, and failures of the modern world-system. They hypothesize that this problem of homo academicus (understood as a collective subject) responsibility can be systematically researched in the context of scientists’ and scholars’ activities as personal social and anthropological practices concerned with re-pro-ducing the social. This article follows E. Levinas’s idea that every form of subjectivity a priori acts as a form of responsibility, while also using J. Caputo’s concept of “the end of ethics”, reframing it as a strategy of “open-ended responsibility” in which the structure and contents of responsibility always have the potential to be reconsidered. Homo academicus is one of the subjects of Modernity; it is intimately related to the production of the social. Scientists and scholars as experts, idea generators, consultants, tenured professors etc. take part in and are responsible (alongside other subjects of Modernity) for the production of images of the human being (homo economicus, politicus, religiosus etc.). They themselves act within one of those images — homo academicus. In general, since the beginning of the twentieth century the social sciences and the humanities have gone from the universal rationality of M. Weber to the idea of methodologies with limited responsibility of V. Rozin. Through our study of the existential nature of scientific activity, we come to the conclusion that scientific cognition does not just legitimize social being and point at its problems; it also establishes hope for a better way of being where there's a place for truth, values of freedom, responsibility, friendship, creativity.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):60-72
60-72
Meaning, Subjectness and Responsibilityin Digital Communications
Abstract
Meaning, comprehension and sense formation, subjectness as a responsible self-consciousness and action form the core of human being provided by communication. This paper contains an attempt to answer the question — what do digital communication formats change in this core. There are used the concepts of pragmasemantics and deep semiotics, which allow concretizing the role of socio-cultural practices as meaning-formation interfaces, as well as showing the role of subjectivity as a source, means and result of meaning-formation. The challenges to social and humanitarian knowledge generated by digitalization are systematically considered. It is significant that the consideration of each of the challenges leads to the problem of sane subjectivity. Thus, the analysis of the ethical and legal challenge leads to the need to further clarification of the relationship between control technology and personal parrhesia, to overcome the imbalance of rights and responsibilities. Consideration of the political economic challenge reveals the fact of the emergence of existential rent and, in this regard, new inequalities, perspectives for a new stratification of society. The metaphysical challenge shows the emergence of a human-option and “non-human” subjectness — with the prospect of building a social reality between these two poles. The anthropological challenge opens up prospects for stratification depending on the degree of acceptance and implementation of responsible subjectivity. Thus, the conducted analysis shows the non-eliminable role of subjectness as an integral interface of meaning formation and a key factor of procreativity and pre-adaptation, which ensured and continue to provide the development of civilization. This positions humanitarian knowledge in a new way, the demand for it, and sets also the task of institutionalizing a complexe humanitarian expertise not only of the consequences of new technologies, but of the stages of their design, development and implementation.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):73-92
73-92
Strategies of Naturalistic Explanation of Moral Responsibility: Compatibilism and Eliminativism
Abstract
The article explores the intuition of moral responsibility from a naturalistic perspective. The aim of the article was to analyse what possible naturalistic approaches to the concept of moral responsibility are possible from a neurophilosophical point of view. The aim is to revisit the concept of moral responsibility in order to remove the libertarian and classical compatibilist intuition and move towards a naturalistic explanation. This study shows that the intuition of moral responsibility is based on the fact that the human brain is endowed with two different parallel systems of perception of causality. With this empirical evidence in mind, two possible strategies for a naturalistic explanation of moral responsibility are proposed, conceptualised as neurophilosophical compatibilism (NC) and neurophilosophical eliminativism (NE). The first NC strategy is defended by an epistemic argument which argues that knowing exactly how someone is determined is fundamentally limited, and so we should not base our ideas about moral responsibility on actual compatibilist control alone. The second strategy of NE is divided on the strength of the elimination of moral responsibility: either the whole concept of moral responsibility or only its ontological reality is eliminated. In the first option, we are faced with the need to develop an alternative system of punishment, law and overcoming the persistent intuition of moral responsibility. In the second scenario, the preservation of moral responsibility as an emergent functional property is accepted and a total reduction to ontological naturalism or, in the case of an unreductive naturalistic approach, to ontological pluralism is achieved.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):93-110
93-110
Social practices
Existential Problems of the Philosophy of Nursing J. Travelby and K. Martinsen in the Perspective of Palliative Care
Abstract
This article examines the philosophical theories of nursing by J. Travelby and K. Martinsen. The central object of research is some ways in which both theories explain the existential problems in the medical practice, using the example of the search for existential values, experience of illness, the proximity of death and care. This article also discusses the philosophical foundation of both theories, their advantages and disadvantages, and limitations of application. Travelby's theory of interpersonal relationships is one of the first attempts to integrate philosophical language into nursing. This synthesis can be called successful, but not profound. The main goal of nursing is the search for meaning. K. Martinsen, on the contrary, achieved success in the depth of this philosophical synthesis, but it made this theory more difficult. Inspired by the philosophy of Heidegger, Martinsen chose care as the central concept of her theory. Particular attention in the text is given to the possibility of extrapolating these models to the theory and practice of palliative care for adults and children. The analysis allows us to conclude that the application of the philosophical theories of Travelby and Martinsen can be of value for palliative care, both in a descriptive and exploratory way, and as a model for teaching in specialist-patient interaction.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):111-128
111-128
AI Health Ethical Review: A Value Design Methodology
Abstract
As our world becomes more dependent on data, algorithms are increasingly being used to make informed decisions in areas ranging from finance to HR. The healthcare sector is no exception, and artificial intelligence systems are becoming more and more widespread in this area. While AI can help us make more informed and efficient decisions, it also presents many moral and ethical challenges. One of the biggest issues is the issue of trust. When "machine" replaces "human" decision making, it can be difficult for patients and healthcare professionals to trust the outcome. In addition, the "black box" mechanisms in artificial intelligence systems make it unclear who is responsible for the decisions made, which can lead to ethical dilemmas. In addition, there is a risk of emotional frustration for patients and healthcare professionals, as AI may not be able to provide the kind of human touch that is often needed in healthcare. Despite increased attention to these issues in recent years, technical solutions to these complex moral and ethical issues are often developed without regard to the social context and opinions of the advocates affected by the technology. In addition, calls for more ethical and socially responsible AI often focus on basic legal principles such as "transparency" and "responsibility" and leave out the much more problematic area of human values. To solve this problem, the article proposes a "value-sensitive" approach to the development of AI, which can help translate basic human rights and values into context-sensitive requirements for AI algorithms. This approach can help create a route from human values to clear and understandable requirements for AI design. It can also help overcome ethical issues that hinder the responsible implementation of AI in healthcare and everyday life.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):129-145
129-145
Environmental Responsibility of the Population: Experience of Sociological measurement
Abstract
The materials of surveys conducted within the framework of the «International Social Survey Programme» in 2020 - 2021 are analyzed. The main attention is paid to identifying the level of environmental responsibility of the Russian population in comparison with other countries participating in the project. On the basis of multidimensional analysis, integrative indicators were calculated that characterize the environmental responsibility of the population by taking into account social attitudes and behavioral practices. It is stated that in Russia the principles of environmental responsibility are relatively weakly expressed. Russians are much less prepared for additional material spending and self-limiting actions in order to preserve the environment. At the same time, the minimum level of involvement of the population in the practices of environmentally responsible behavior is fixed, which is partly due to insufficiently developed infrastructure. It is concluded that, despite the postulation at the state level of the need to form an ecological culture of the population, in Russia, in comparison with other states, low indicators of environmental responsibility are recorded. The factors of environmental responsibility of Russians are considered. The presence of a significant direct correlation between the severity of environmental responsibility attitudes and the personal income of the respondents was revealed. It is noted that in our country there is a feedback between personal income and practices of environmentally responsible behavior, which can be considered as evidence of the important role of the motive for financial savings. Education is considered as the main channel for the formation of environmental responsibility. It is stated that only in Russia there is no statistically significant relationship between the level of education and the components of environmental responsibility. Highly educated Russians, as well as poorly educated compatriots, demonstrate a low level of formation of environmental responsibility attitudes and involvement in environmentally responsible behavior. It is concluded that the implementation of environmental education in modern Russia faces significant problems.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):146-164
146-164
Symbols. Values. Ideals.
Moral Responsibility, Moral Sanctions, and the Value and Normative Content of Morality
Abstract
The paper deals with the problem of the role of moral of sanctions — an expression of retrospective moral responsibility — in the moral experience. Moral sanctions are negative consequences of a moral transgression or deviation that spring from their condemnation. This kind of sanctions includes public censure and self-censure. The author tries to establish whether the all content of morality is supported by moral sanctions. The first object of the analysis are moral norms (rules, requirements) creating obligations. There is an interesting precedent of splitting apart obligations and sanctions in H. Hart’s philosophy. Though Hart overlooks “the conceptual intuition that something can be genuinely obligatory only if those who are obligated can justifiably be held responsible or accountable for compliance” (S. Darwall). This intuition is deeply rooted in the moral consciousness and ethical thought (the most vivid examples — S. Pufendorf and J.S. Mill). But moral norms (rules, requirements) creating obligations are not the only element of the content of morality. Moral values have a capacity to influence the behavior of an agent not through norms (rules, requirements) but directly. R. Nozick supposed that there is a special type of sanction in this sphere (the so called “value sanction”). The author shows that it is not a sanction proper. The main conclusion of the paper is as follows: the moral space without sanctions and retrospective responsibility is the space there moral values influence the behavior of an agent not only directly but without overlapping with moral norms (rules, requirements). Supererogation fits the bill perfectly.
Čelovek. 2023;34(3):165-182
165-182
Reviews
183-186