Problemy Dalʹnego Vostoka

Despite the fact that the presidential and parliamentary elections in Taiwan in 2024 took place in an unprecedentedly difficult international political environment, and the campaign itself was competitive, in general, the election results can be considered as consistent with preliminary polls. However, they highlighted a number of important trends in Taiwan's political life that will influence the island's future: notably, the DPP candidate won for the third time in a row. Although the expert community has recorded a softening of the position of DPP leader Lai Qingde regarding the issue of Taiwan's status compared to the previous period, the general rhetoric of party representatives creates the preconditions for maintaining tension in cross-strait relations. However, the fact that the KMT won the majority of seats in parliament will likely balance the situation. The current campaign is also specific considering that the struggle unfolded not only between representatives of two traditionally opposing camps — the DPP and the KMT but also a serious competition for the candidates came from representatives of the TPP, who also expanded their representation in parliament following the election results. Thus, Taiwan's political landscape is becoming more diverse and needs to be studied more seriously. Competition between the island's political powers inevitably has an impact on the political situation in the Taiwan Strait, which consequently affects relations with the mainland. The relations with Beijing remain a central issue for the political platforms of the main Taiwanese political parties. Within the two largest parties — the KMT and the DPP — relations with Beijing are the issue of serious internal debates. The balance of power in cross-strait relations has undergone major changes in recent years, as Taiwan's political forces have tried to adapt to the generational change and respond to major events such as the 2019 Hong Kong riots and the COVID-19 pandemic. The article examines the changes in the approaches of the Taiwanese parties to relations with the mainland in the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections in January 2024 and their possible consequences for relations between the sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Korea were held on April 10, 2024. Although parliament is not as significant part of the political system as the presidency, its role does increase if the president and parliamentary majority are from different parties. This scenario developed after the 2022 presidential elections, which were won by Yoon Suk-yeol. As a result, the government's ability to implement policies that go against the opposition's opinion was limited. In the 2024 elections the ruling party aimed to gain a parliamentary majority or at least maintain its current position, while the opposition tried to achieve a constitutional majority. As a result, there was only an internal reshuffling of the political camps. The Democratic Party once again achieved a convincing victory, winning 169 of the 300 seats, while another 19 were won by DP’s allies. The ruling party won only 108 seats, marginally improving its performance in Seoul and Busan. Despite internal divisions, «third» parties were unable to achieve significant results. The opposition succeeded in consolidating the protest vote to counter the Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration, who will face opposition from parliament during his remaining three years in office. However, the opposition failed to achieve its goal of gaining a parliamentary majority.

The article analyzes the Chinese banks` activities in Russia in the first years of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). Four subsidiaries of state-owned commercial banks (ICBC, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank), and two representative offices of China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China respectively, operate in the Russian market. The banks provide a full range of banking products and services primarily to companies doing business with China, including lending, accounts opening and maintaining, foreign exchange and financial transactions, and letters of credit business. The author notes a significant increase of Chinese four subsidiaries` assets during 2022–2023. Regarding the liabilities, there was also a growth in the category "amounts due to credit organizations" (other banks` LORO accounts` transactions, interbank operations), which is associated with the necessity of an increased number of client payments due the increasing volume of Sino-Russo trade turnover and restrictions on settlements on USD and EUR. These trends have contributed to the growth of both the client base and profits of Chinese subsidiaries that charge commissions for account maintenance, settlements, and, moreover, had a positive impact on the increase in the volume of settlements in national currencies. The article analyzes the structure of settlements under foreign trade contracts and draws a conclusion about the growing predominance of national currencies. The author notes that in general, Chinese financial institutions pursue a cautious credit policy, focusing on maintaining stability and leveling various risks.

The article is devoted to studying financial liberalization in China. The study is identified the main stages of financial liberalization and its adjustments depending on internal and external circumstances. A new international financial crisis is growing and has already begun to affect China's economy. A comparative analysis of China and the G20 developing countries was carried out in terms of financial openness and financial integration into the global financial system, cryptocurrencies regulations and digital national currency, features of economic policy and the state of the external financial sector. China's liberalization policy began with the removal of restrictions on foreign direct investment and the current account. The priorities of the financial liberalization policy is changed by reason of the economy grows and develops: from domestic economic development to the financial expansion of other countries in order to gain access to new markets and technologies. But most restrictions on the movement capital remain in China. The use of cryptocurrencies as an opportunity to circumvent currency restrictions is legally prohibited, and instead an attempt is being made to impose a national digital currency on society. The degree of government participation in the economy plays an important financial liberalization. Comparing other developing countries, China has a much higher degree of government involvement in the economy. This allows to maintain macroeconomic stability within the country even during international financial and economic crises. It is concluded that a gradual and partial financial liberalization with the maintaining domestic macroeconomic stability will provide the best results.

The purpose of the article is to identify trends and features of the development of a low-carbon economy and climate control tools in Indonesia using methods of content analysis, quantitative and comparative assessment. Climate goals declared for the period up to 2030 and 2050 are analyzed and there has been a rise in climate ambitions, based largely on measures to decarbonise the land and forestry sector. The peculiarity of Indonesia's climate goals is that they are defined relative to a business-as-usual scenario, which assumes the current rate of growth in greenhouse gas emissions and are calculated subject to the provision of international financial assistance. The long-term strategy for low-carbon development until 2050 is considered and government priorities in the field of climate regulation are identified. While forced to maintain coal generation as its long-term energy backbone, Indonesia is seeking to pursue other avenues: introducing carbon pricing, incentivizing renewable energy, increasing production of electric vehicles, and developing and deploying carbon capture technology. By providing state support to priority areas, Indonesia actively takes advantage of the opportunities provided by international financial organizations to finance climate projects. It is concluded that the long-term low-carbon development strategy and associated climate goals in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and the time frame for achieving carbon neutrality are quite moderate, since they are based on a comparison with the business-as-usual scenario. With this approach to strategic planning, it will be possible to achieve the set goals by implementing measures only in the land and forestry sector, while the volume of greenhouse gas emissions in other sectors may not decrease, but increase in absolute terms. This approach is explained by national interests and the desire to preserve coal generation in the energy sector.

The article identifies the Chinese provinces that are the points of growth of the Russian imports. Their main supply channels to the Chinese market are concentrated in the eastern coastal regions of China, being traditionally more developed. Russian imports are growing faster through the Chinese pilot free trade zones. However, geographical and product diversification is still slow. The supply structure of Russian products is still dominated by raw materials, while imports of high value added products are growing rapidly in some regions of China. The rapid growth of Russian imports is observed in some regions of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, which creates additional opportunities for the intensification of trade interactions with the Russian regions within the project «Volga-Yangtze». The connection of the export sectors of the economy of the Volga Federal District with the import of China is considered in more detail in the article as a potential for further intensification of trade interactions. The regions with a high level of economic diversification (the Nizhny Novgorod and the Samara regions) have the greatest opportunities for developing trade interactions. Current conditions indicate that prospects for the further intensification of Russian exports to China are determined by the expansion of production (in the regions with a high share of exports to China and other friendly countries), development of transport and logistics system, adaptation of Russian products to the needs of the Chinese consumer. One way to increase exports of Rus-sian high-value-added products is to reduce barriers to the supply of such products in China’s free-trade zones. In a limited international market, Russian regions may have to compete more for Chinese consumers as the domestic market becomes saturated.

This paper is devoted to the analysis of the esoteric version of the origin of the Japanese language, put forward by the Buddhist monk Keichū 契沖 (1640–1701), who is considered the founder of the national cultural and philosophical movement kokugaku 國學, emerging during the Tokugawa period. In his main treatise Man'yō Daishōki 万葉代匠記, relying on his own set of orthographic rules for spelling Japanese in kana (kanazukai 仮名遣い), Keichū tries to prove the inconsistency of the former Fujiwara Teika system and at the same time to reveal the esoteric nature of the structure of speech. According to Keichū, fifty characters of the Japanese alphabet make up a whole integral system in which all sounds originate from the Sanskrit sign “A”. This shows the interdependent relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm, expressed in the sounds that form the language as an instrument of communication and comprehension, which manifests the universality of the nature of the cosmic Buddha Vairochana. Based on this metonymic connection, Keichū concludes that studying the structure of the Japanese language is equivalent to cognition of the world as a sacred object and, accordingly, forms a more rational and open approach to understanding the essence of classical Japanese literature, which distinguishes it favorably from the closed linear tradition adopted in the Heian era. Further study of Man'yō Daishōki is of particular interest to researchers of the kokugaku school, since it may provide additional information about the Buddhist origins of this trend, whose followers then, on the contrary, denied the positive influence of Buddhism on Japanese culture and preferred not to mention Keichū at all as the founder of kokugaku tradition (for example, Hirata Atsutane). It may also shed light on the contribution of Buddhist philosophy to the formation of the tradition of scientific empiricism in Japan at the end of the XVII century.

Christianity-jingjiao along with Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism is one of the so-called ‘three barbarian teachings’ san yi jiao, which were introduced in mediaeval China almost simultaneously. All three teachings were able to adapt to the Chinese cultural and socio-political milieu and became part of the Chinese religious and cultural landscape. The fragmentary character of the Chinese jingjiao documents, which were found in Dunhuang, and a very obscure social and political status of this doctrine, however, make it very complicated and difficult to reconstruct the place of jingjiao in mediaeval Chinese society as much as its ideological and doctrinal features because of the vast absorption of the Taoist and Buddhist elements. Such an obscure and very ‘fuzzy’ character of this teaching makes its impact on studies resulting in highly improbable and erroneous conclusions. In this paper, an attempt has been made to classify periodically the steps in the studies of the Tang China jingjiao phenomenon, highlighting three basic periods in it, to characterize each of them and to single out the most important authors and their works and to pose or re-formulate some questions, which can appear in the process of the investigation of this problematic religious teaching, e.g. linguistic and philological problems, including textological and palaeographical ones; problems of historical context, given the wide cultural and political aspects of Tang China’s connections with Sasanian Iran and Silk Road states; questions of ethnic and religious identity, which seems to be very ambiguous matter; problems of decline and disappearance of jingjiao in later period.