Coalition Formation in Dynamic Multicriteria Games
- Авторы: Rettieva A.N.1,2,3
- 
							Учреждения: 
							- School of Mathematics and Statistics
- Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong
- Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center
 
- Выпуск: Том 80, № 10 (2019)
- Страницы: 1912-1927
- Раздел: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/151202
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919100114
- ID: 151202
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Аннотация
In this paper, new approaches to obtain optimal behavior in dynamic multicriteria games are suggested. The multicriteria Nash equilibrium is designed via the Nash bargaining scheme (Nash products), and the cooperative equilibrium is determined by the Nash bargaining solution for the entire planning horizon. The process of coalition formation in dynamic mul-ticriteria games is studied. For constructing the characteristic function the Nash bargaining scheme is applied, where the multicriteria Nash equilibrium plays the role of the status quo points. Two modifications of the characteristic function are presented that take into account the information structure of the game (the models without and with information). The dynamic multicriteria bioresource management problem is considered. The players’ strategies and the quantities of resource are compared under the cooperative and noncooperative behavior for the above modifications of the characteristic function.
Об авторах
A. Rettieva
School of Mathematics and Statistics; Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong; Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center
							Автор, ответственный за переписку.
							Email: annaret@krc.karelia.ru
				                					                																			                												                	Китай, 							Qingdao, 266071; Qingdao, 266071; Petrozavodsk						
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