Atomic Routing Game with Capacity Constraints


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详细

A model of an atomic routing game is considered. A network in this model has capacity constraints. Players in this game choose routes from some sources to one sink. The cost of passing each arc is determined by an increasing and convex function that depends on the number of players. Algorithms for finding the Nash equilibrium and social optimum are developed. These algorithms have a polynomial time complexity. The model can be used for transport networks with limited traffic flows.

作者简介

D. Pal’tseva

Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes; Institute for Problems of Regional Economics

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: adandreevna@mail.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg

A. Parfenov

Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes; Institute for Problems of Regional Economics

Email: adandreevna@mail.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg

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