Typology of Networks and Equilibria in a Network Game with Production and Knowledge Externalities


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This paper considers a network game as follows. In each node of a network, economy is described by the simple two-period Romer’s model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. The sum of knowledge levels in the neighbor nodes causes an externality in the production of each network node. The concept of node type is introduced and a corresponding typology of networks is suggested. As demonstrated below, all inner equilibria of the game are determined by this typology. For several typologies, the equilibrium knowledge levels are found in explicit form for the nodes that have different positions in the network.

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V. Matveenko

Higher School of Economics (National Research University), St. Petersburg Branch

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Email: vmatveenko@hse.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg

A. Korolev

Higher School of Economics (National Research University), St. Petersburg Branch

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Email: danitschi@gmail.com
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg

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