Interacting oligopolistic and oligopsonistic Cournot markets
- 作者: Zorkaltsev V.I.1, Kiseleva M.A.1
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隶属关系:
- Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch
- 期: 卷 78, 编号 5 (2017)
- 页面: 953-959
- 栏目: Large Scale Systems Control
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/150608
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917050162
- ID: 150608
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详细
This paper considers the model of several interacting Cournot markets. Some of them are final goods markets, while the others are resource markets. The markets interact by sharing the same set of economic agents (producers), so that the latter are oligopsonists on resource markets and simultaneously oligopolists on goods markets. Each producer strategically chooses its supply volumes on each goods market and its purchase volume of resources in accordance with technology and expected supply effects on prices. We prove that in the case of linear demand and supply functions the model of interacting Cournot markets is reduced to a potential game; hence, the Nash equilibrium problem is equivalent to a mathematical programming problem. We also discuss the advantages and special features of such a representation of interacting oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets.
作者简介
V. Zorkaltsev
Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: zork@isem.sei.irk.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Irkutsk
M. Kiseleva
Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, Siberian Branch
Email: zork@isem.sei.irk.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Irkutsk
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