Email this article A Game-Theoretic Model of Agreement on Limitation of Transboundary Air Pollution
- Authors: Vasin A.A.1, Divtsova A.G.1
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Affiliations:
- Moscow State University
- Issue: Vol 80, No 6 (2019)
- Pages: 1164-1176
- Section: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/151424
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919060134
- ID: 151424
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Abstract
This paper considers a model of agreements for the problem of transboundary air pollution by industrial emissions. The interaction of countries is described by a repeated game with side payments. The aim is to find the existence conditions of a subgame perfect equilibrium that implements a Pareto-optimal strategy profile in each period of the game.
About the authors
A. A. Vasin
Moscow State University
Author for correspondence.
Email: vasin@cs.msu.su
Russian Federation, Moscow
A. G. Divtsova
Moscow State University
Author for correspondence.
Email: nastyakislaeva@gmail.com
Russian Federation, Moscow
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