Strong Time-Consistent Subset of the Core in Cooperative Differential Games with Finite Time Horizon

O. L. Petrosian; E. V. Gromova; S. V. Pogozhev

doi:10.1134/S0005117918100144

Strong Time-Consistent Subset of the Core in Cooperative Differential Games with Finite Time Horizon

作者: Petrosian O.L.¹, Gromova E.V.¹, Pogozhev S.V.¹
隶属关系:
1. St. Petersburg State University
期: 卷 79, 编号 10 (2018)
页面: 1912-1928
栏目: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/0005-1179/article/view/151059
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117918100144
ID: 151059

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详细

Time consistency is one of the most important properties of solutions in cooperative differential games. This paper uses the core as a cooperative solution of the game. We design a strong time-consistent subset of the core. The design method of this subset is based on a special class of imputation distribution procedures (IDPs).