Models of Two-Stage Mutual Best Choice


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详细

In this paper, we develop and study a game-theoretic model of mutual choice with two types of agents (groups) as follows. Each agent wants to make a couple with another agent from the opposite group. In contrast to classical best-choice models, two agents make a couple only by mutual agreement. We consider two setups, namely, natural mating (each agent acts in accordance with personal interests) and artificial selection (forced mating to maximize the average quality of couples). In the first case, the Nash equilibrium is determined; in the second case, an optimal selection procedure is designed. We analyze some modifications of the problem with different payoff functions and incomplete information.

作者简介

S. Dotsenko

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: sergei204@ukr.net
乌克兰, Kyiv

A. Ivashko

Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center

Email: sergei204@ukr.net
俄罗斯联邦, Petrozavodsk

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