Equilibrium in a Network Game with Production and Knowledge Externalities


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详细

In each node of a network, economy is described by the simple two-period Romer’s model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. The sum of knowledge levels in the neighbor nodes causes an externality in the production of each node of the network. The game equilibrium in the network is investigated. The agents’ solutions depending on the size of externality are obtained. The uniqueness of inner equilibrium is proved. The role of passive agents in network formation is studied; in particular, the possibilities of adding a passive agent to a regular network, and also of joining of regular networks through nodes with passive agents. It is shown that the sum of knowledge levels in all the nodes decreases under adding of a new link.

作者简介

V. Matveenko

Higher School of Economics (National Research University), St. Petersburg Branch

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: vmatveenko@hse.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg

A.V. Korolev

Higher School of Economics (National Research University), St. Petersburg Branch

Email: vmatveenko@hse.ru
俄罗斯联邦, St. Petersburg

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