On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment


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There is a paradox in the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) called “pit of losses.” It consists in the fact that a series of democratic decisions may systematically lead the society to the states unacceptable for all the voters. The paper examines how this paradox can be neutralized by the presence in society of a group that votes for its benefit and can regulate the threshold of its claims. We obtain and analyze analytical results characterizing the welfare of the whole society, the group, and the other participants as functions of the said claims threshold.

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V. Malyshev

Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences; Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: vit312@gmail.com
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow; Moscow

P. Chebotarev

Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences; Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology

Email: vit312@gmail.com
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow; Moscow

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