The Red Army and the disruption of the plans of the German command in the Oboyan direction in the summer of 1943

In the history of the 1943 summer campaign on the Soviet-German front, the initial plans of the Wehrmacht and the Kursk defensive operation of the Red Army, as well as the fighting in the Voronezh Front, have been most studied. However, the final version of Operation Citadel is practically not covered in historiography. The idea of this Wehrmacht operation is usually presented only as counterattacks by two groups concentrated at the base of the Kursk salient, with the aim of encircling the Central and Voronezh fronts. But the 2nd Field Army, commanded by Infantry General V. V., was also to take part in the offensive. Weiss, who occupied the defense in the western part of the Kursk Bulge. Its strike from the west in the direction of Kursk, the junction of the Central and Voronezh fronts, could significantly complicate the situation of the Red Army. The documents found in the German Federal Archive confirm that the German command was counting on such a development of events. By the beginning of the general offensive on Kursk, the divisions allocated to break through the defense were brought to the maximum degree of readiness. A comparative analysis of these materials and Soviet documents makes it possible to understand how, thanks to the unparalleled fortitude and courage of the soldiers of the Voronezh Front, it was possible to paralyze the enemy forces in the Oboyansk direction.

The Battle of Kursk, Operation Citadel, Voronezh Front, N.F. Vatutin, V. Weiss