Vol 7, No 4 (2025)

In the modern philosophical discussion of education, the question of the relationship between freedom and responsibility occupies a key place, especially in the context of a humanistic approach. This work explores the philosophical roots and practical application of the concept of freedom and responsibility in the pedagogical system of A. Neill, an outstanding representative of humanistic pedagogy of the XX century. Analyzing his ideas through the prism of philosophical categories, the author seeks to understand their logic and significance for modern humanistic education, as well as to determine the place of Neill's pedagogy within the framework of ethical philosophy. The research is based on the assumption that Neill's pedagogy is a practical realization of the idea of an inextricable link between freedom and responsibility in personal development. Freedom is seen here not as the opposite of responsibility, but as a necessary condition for its emergence. Responsibility is understood as an internal incentive formed in the process of self-improvement.

This article focuses on constructing a verbal sketch of a theoretical model for the holistic process of ethical regulation in research activity. Particular attention is paid to the role played in this process by the ethical traditions and attitudes inherent to a scientific school. The article's content reflects the following: the meaning of the concept of a scientific school, which is heuristically valuable for the conducted research; the features of ethical regulation in research activity, as well as corporate and professional ethical codes as instruments for its implementation; the author's perspective on the internal discretionary and external imperative frameworks of ethical regulation in research activity.

This paper presents an interdisciplinary analysis of the impact of neural interfaces (NIs) on the fundamental structures of human self-awareness, specifically the construct of the "phenomenal body". The core thesis of the research is that the phenomenal body – the subjectively experienced unity and ownership of bodily experience – is not a static given but is sustained by a dynamic equilibrium of proprioceptive, vestibular, and interoceptive signals that ensure ontological security and the authenticity of the "Self". The article argues that neural interfaces, by establishing a direct bypassing pathway for sensorimotor control and perception, act as a catalyst for a profound transformation of this construct. We trace the trajectory of this transformation: from embodiment – a traditional state characterized by the inseparable link between consciousness and the biological body – to excorporation – a new modality of corporeality in which an individual's sense of self migrates, expands, or is partially transferred to external, synthetic, or virtual agents.Within the framework of the paper, the mechanisms of this deconstruction are analyzed: the disruption of the proprioceptive loop, the modulation of affective homeostasis, and the redefinition of the boundaries between "self" and "non-self". The study is theoretical and philosophical in nature, drawing on the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology, neuroscience (in particular, Antonio Damasio's theory of somatosensory homeostasis), and Science and Technology Studies (STS). The conclusion discusses the ethical and existential implications of this shift, which concern issues of identity, agency, and the new configuration of human existence in the age of symbiosis with technology.

Modern science, penetrating the mysteries of existence, reveals its multidimensionality and complexity, necessitating the introduction of new concepts that adequately describe its achievements. These include the concept of ambivalence, which is a dialectical relationship of the mutual transition of opposites, capable of existing outside the context of dialectical contradiction. The scientific novelty of this study stems from the use of achievements of the post-Marxist stage of dialectic development. The goal of this study is to find a relevant description of the subject of neuroethics. The ambivalence of neuroethics is a special case of the ambivalence of professional ethics, which requires not only the conscientious performance of professional work but also its ethical justification as aimed at the benefit of the individual and humanity. The uniqueness of neuroethics lies in the fact that neuroscience significantly influences the understanding of morality, transforms established notions, and represents an attempt, albeit hypothetically, to answer philosophical questions using concrete scientific results from the study of brain function. This last circumstance elevates neuroethics to the rank of applied ethics, the solution to whose problems has no historical precedent. The ambivalence of neuroethics as applied ethics is characterized by the contradictory interaction of natural science and humanities knowledge, which problematizes the substantial existence of morality and raises questions about the limits of human freedom. Neuroscientific research can be interpreted as limiting and narrowing the scope of morality. But such a view only scratches the surface; in essence, we are talking about a reconsideration of the foundations of morality, forcing a new answer to the question of human freedom and its limits. Advances in neuroscience and the possibility of their use in neurotechnology increase the effectiveness of manipulation technologies and pose a serious threat to human freedom. Thus, the neuroscientific foundations of ethics necessarily presuppose philosophical reflection. Ethics is a conscious philosophical justification of morality and constitutes an obstacle to unlimited, unjustified influence on the human brain. The study of brain function and its results should contribute to the human good, and only on this basis can a professional code of conduct be developed for scientists engaged in brain research. Today, social and humanities expertise is not a luxury, but a vital necessity. In the context of communicative rationality, humanities expertise must represent a communicative discourse that will not only be interdisciplinary but also located within the space of citizen science.

The paper examines the concept of anthropoconservatism developed by V.A. Kutyrev. For this purpose, a critical analysis of V.A. Kutyrev's interpretation of F. Bacon's empiricism and I. Kant's transcendentalism is carried out. In his opinion, these philosophers play the role of key figures whose ideas played a crucial role in the turn of European humanity towards a technogenic civilization. At the same time, it was Bacon who filled scientific knowledge with a certain utilitarian content, acting as the forerunner of the technogenic era. We concretize Bacon's civilizational project of building paradise on Earth by means of science. It is also pointed out that V.A. Kutyrev underestimated Descartes' rationalism, the development of whose ideas ultimately led to the emergence of Artificial Intelligence, which plays the role of a man-made God in Bacon's man-made paradise. Further, the interpretation of I. Kant's transcendentalism is considered within the framework of Kutyrev's anthropoconservatism, first of all, Kant's Copernican turn and his doctrine of the "thing in itself", which ultimately lead European humanity to virtual reality technologies and initiate the exploration of outer space, the rationale for the feasibility of which is subsequently carried out within the framework of Russian cosmism by N.F. Fedorov and K.E. Tsiolkovsky, whom V.A. Kutyrev calls the first theoretical traitors to the Earth and "Luciferians". Disagreement is expressed with such an interpretation of Kant's work, in which we agree with B. Russell, who claimed that Kant carried out a "Ptolemaic counterrevolution" by placing the knowing subject at the center of his epistemology, while Copernicus removed man from the center of the Universe, placing the Sun there. By limiting the possibilities of the human mind, Kant casts doubt on the possibility of implementing Bacon's civilizational project, acting as an anthropoconservative. The movement towards virtual reality technologies occurred not thanks to, but in spite of Kant, as a result of his followers' attempts to refute the doctrine of the "thing in itself". Here we agree with A. Kozhev. It was Hegel, not Kant, who built a consistent philosophy of death. In the final part of the work, an exit to general ontological problems is made, which leads to the substantiation of the cardinal truth "We will all die!" However, as a free being, a person can choose the strategy of anthropoconservatism, striving to prolong his existence as much as possible, or the opposite Nietzschean strategy, when the highest value is given not to existence, but to development.

The relevance of this research topic stems from the complex interplay of stochastic and deterministic processes in the development of modern society, which inevitably impact the development strategies of many state institutions. Among these, education is one of the fundamental institutions, crucial for the future development of both individuals and society as a whole. The contradictions that emerge in the context of rapid change, reformist reforms, and sharp challenges in foreign and domestic policy compel us to turn to the critical apparatus of philosophical thought. The essence and conceptual apparatus of philosophy allow us to extrapolate its heuristic potential to education by approaching metaphysical questions about the role of values in education and in the formation of the individual and society. Using sociocultural tools, philosophy can analyze the functioning of the education system in society and outline the contours of its changes, as well as the stages of change in the form and structure of education. The reflexive apparatus of a worldview, its capacity for universal paradigmatic generalizations, allows us to identify key patterns in the worldview, as well as the particularities of its manifestation in the organization of the educational process; the forecasting apparatus and creative potential of philosophy have the ability to design and strategize the future goals and results of education. The philosophy of education is called upon to identify and illuminate the challenges facing modern education and to outline ways to overcome them. The scientific novelty of this work lies in its comprehensive methodological approach to education from the perspective of philosophy, using its conceptual apparatus as an epistemological tool of cognition. The purpose of this research is to uncover the potential of philosophy in its essential and conceptual manifestations for studying and understanding the education system within the context of contemporary societal development trends, distinguishing between education as an autonomous sphere of science and its philosophical reception as the philosophy of education. The approaches employed involve epistemological, axiological, and historical-philosophical analysis, allowing us to identify the problems and lines of research in education, as well as the ideological aspects of its understanding. The results of the study demonstrate that education as a philosophy of education and education as pedagogy, while autonomous, exist in a dialectical relationship, constituting a unity and opposition within the current sociocultural reality. Philosophy of education serves as a metatheoretical foundation, defining goals, values, and meanings, while educational methods in the field of pedagogy are practical tools for solving institutional problems. The prospects and practical significance of this work lie in providing a philosophical discourse on education that reveals it as a complex problem, identifying significant values for the development of individuals, states, nations, and people, as well as institutional mechanisms for managing education. Recommendations emphasize the need to recognize the epistemological productivity of the conceptual apparatus of educational philosophy, which emerges through axiological, systemic, processual, and results-based approaches.