Construction of the Mathematical Model of Pricing for Telecommunication Services with Allowance for Congestion in Networks

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This paper considers a model of dynamic pricing in the telecommunications market incomplete competition and taking into account overloads in multiservice networks. The model consists in the use of mathematical modeling methods, game theory and queueing theory. It is assumed that telecommunication companies agree on the rules of incoming and outgoing traffic charging in pairs, and this charging is built as a function of the tariffs that companies offer their subscribers for service. Companies are limited the agreement on mutual rules of reciprocal proportional charging for access traffic at first, which subsequently determine the tariffs for the multiservice network users. The reciprocity of the rules means that companies are subject to the same rules for the entire time interval during which the agreement is in force. Taking into account imperfect competition in the telecommunications market and using profit optimization method for each company the equilibrium tariffs and the volume of services are found with subject to congestion in multi-service networks.

作者简介

S Vasilyev

Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: vasilyev_sa@rudn.university

Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, assistant professor of Department of Applied Probability and Informatics of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

Hassan Haroun

Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

Email: harounhassan198@yahoo.fr

PhD student of Department of Applied Probability and Informatics of Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)

6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation

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