The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as an Alternative Mechanism for the Settlement of Trade Disputes

The subject of the study is the functioning of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as an alternative appellate mechanism for resolving trade disputes within the WTO in the context of the paralysis of the Appellate Body. The study examines the legal foundations, institutional design and procedural structure of the MPIA, as well as its practical operation based on disputes DS583, DS591 and DS611. Particular attention is paid to identifying the unique features of the MPIA that distinguish it from the classical WTO Appellate Body and bilateral arbitration, including the composition and rotation of arbitrators, the scope of review limited to questions of law, the timeframe for examination and the procedural logic modeled on the suspended appellate system. The analysis demonstrates that the MPIA provides a functional, though limited, alternative for its participants, maintaining minimum predictability and quality control of decisions. At the same time, the research highlights the systemic constraints of the mechanism, stemming from its voluntary nature, its restricted membership (57 participants without the United States), the uncertain precedential status of its awards for non-participants and the absence of a fully institutionalized appellate infrastructure. These factors limit its capacity to serve as a universal substitute for the Appellate Body. The methodological foundation of the study includes comparative legal analysis of the MPIA in relation to the classical Appellate Body and bilateral arbitration, the formal legal method applied to the text of the Arrangement and arbitral awards, as well as examination of the practical application of the mechanism using disputes DS583, DS591 and DS611. The scientific novelty lies in the comprehensive assessment of the MPIA as a transitional appellate model that partially compensates for the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body while falling short of providing a universally applicable solution. The study clarifies the key factors that constrain the universality, legitimacy and systemic role of the mechanism within the WTO dispute settlement system. It is demonstrated that although the MPIA plays a stabilizing role by supporting the rule of law and preventing fragmentation of the multilateral trading system for participating states, it does not eliminate the need for a substantial reform of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The findings may be used in developing state strategies for participation in WTO dispute settlement, in shaping approaches to reforming the Appellate Body and in assessing the future of international economic law in the current crisis of the multilateral trading system.

MPIA, World Trade Organization, Trade disputes, Dispute resolution system, WTO, Appellate Body, Alternative dispute resolution, Arbitration, International law, Economics