No 4 (2025)

The subject of the research is political and discursive model of risk assessment developed by Chinese think tanks in the process of aligning the Belt and Road Initiative with the Eurasian Economic Union. The object of the research is strategic interaction between EAEU and China’s BRI, which is gaining particular significance amid the transformation of geopolitical and economic processes in Eurasia. The author examines in detail the role of Chinese analytical centers as active actors in shaping foreign policy discourse, analyzing their methods of interpreting and neutralizing political risks, and revealing how rhetorical and institutional instruments help create a positive perception of China’s international initiatives. Particular attention is given to the institutional differences between EAEU and BRI, geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia, and the role of China’s soft power in reducing strategic uncertainty. The methodological framework of the study includes discourse analysis, comparative-historical method, and content analysis of analytical reports by Chinese research centers. This approach made it possible to identify rhetorical strategies and cognitive schemes shaping the perception of political risks within Eurasian integration. The scientific novelty of the research lies in viewing Chinese think tanks as independent participants in the foreign policy process, performing not only expert and prognostic but also ideological functions in shaping the strategy of EAEU–BRI alignment. The study demonstrates that they interpret political risks not as threats but as manageable elements of strategic dialogue, facilitating a balance of interests between China and Russia. It concludes that the successful development of Eurasian integration depends on institutional synergy and sustained political dialogue between the two sides. The contribution of the research lies in providing a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which China constructs the perception of political risks, transforming them into a tool for building trust and strengthening the stability of regional cooperation.

The article "US Policy in Southeast Asia in the context of the "turn in the Asia-Pacific region"" analyzes Washington's strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at strengthening its position in the face of China's growing influence. Key aspects of American policy are considered, including the military-strategic presence, economic initiatives (the Indo-Pacific Strategy and participation in the CPTPP), as well as diplomatic cooperation with regional partners, including the ASEAN countries. Special attention is paid to the goals of the United States: curbing Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea and supporting multilateral cooperation. The author explores the evolution of approaches of various administrations (from B. Obama to D. Biden), emphasizing the changes in the implementation of the "U-turn". Challenges are highlighted, including balancing between allied commitments, internal political contradictions in the United States, and the ambiguous reaction of Southeast Asian countries to increased competition between the great powers. The study is based on a comparative analysis of the approaches of the three American administrations (Obama, Trump, Biden) to the implementation of the strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as on the basis of official documents (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy), public statements by the presidents and diplomatic initiatives). Institutional analysis of the role and effectiveness of the multilateral structures and alliances created by the United States as tools for deterring China The scientific novelty of the study lies in a systematic and comparative analysis of the evolution of the "pivot to Asia" strategy over the course of three US administrations, demonstrating not a paradigm shift, but a tactical adaptation of a single strategic goal. Despite tactical and stylistic differences, all three administrations (Obama, Trump, Biden) pursued a common strategic goal – to contain China's growing influence and preserve American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Obama relied on multilateral economic (TPP) and diplomatic instruments. Trump moved to open confrontation, protectionism, and an emphasis on bilateral power and trade deals. Biden synthesized approaches, returning to the rhetoric of multilateralism and working with allies, but preserving and strengthening the tough anti-China core of Trump's strategy, as well as institutionalizing the QUAD format. The deepening US-China rivalry poses serious challenges for ASEAN, forcing it to maneuver and threatening its unity and central role in the regional architecture.

The article examines the political economy of the UN peacekeeping era in Haiti from 2004 to 2019 as a set of practices and institutions through which Brazilian and Chilean investments were made, including state, semi-state, and corporate channels, as well as their connection to mechanisms of security governance and development. The central subject of analysis is the forms, sectoral directions, and political conditions of Brazil and Chile's involvement in Haiti's economic space, as well as the impact of the peacekeeping regime on the distribution of benefits and costs for the host country. The article reconstructs a specific model of "investment support for peacekeeping," in which the economic presence of Brazil and Chile developed in close association with their politico-military role in the UN mission, allowing for the institutional consolidation of priority sectors and forms of market access. It is shown that the investment strategies of both countries had a cooperative yet competitive nature, resulting in the formation of asymmetric resource distribution regimes that intensified the Haitian economy's dependence on external management and financial frameworks. The conclusion is drawn that the peacekeeping framework from 2004 to 2019 served not only as a security tool but also as a factor redistributing economic opportunities in favor of external players, with limited structural modernization in Haiti. The research applied document analysis, quantitative methods, statistical analysis, and comparative data studies. The political economy of "La-Paz" in Haiti from 2004 to 2019 was formed as an institutionally anchored connection between peacekeeping governance and foreign economic presence. The UN mission, having an expanded mandate and coordination powers, not only acted as a guarantor of security but also as an internal regulator of access to reconstruction and donor resources, objectively creating advantages for participating states with the greatest role in the mission. As a result of the comparative analysis, it is shown that the Brazilian strategy relied on military leadership and therefore had a higher capacity to convert peacekeeping resources into economic presence. Brazil's infrastructure, police, and technical programs developed within a unified logic of state-building mandate, confirming the thesis of the inevitable inclusion of the economic dimension in long-term stabilization operations.

The article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of investment cooperation between Russia and Cambodia in the context of geo-economic transformations in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on the paradoxical gap between the declared political closeness of the two countries and their extremely low level of economic interaction. Despite Cambodia's strategic potential as an ASEAN member and its acute need for infrastructure modernization and economic diversification, mutual trade turnover remains insignificant, and the scale of Russian investments significantly lags behind the influence of China and ASEAN countries. The study identifies key barriers to cooperation, including Russia's lack of preferential access to the ASEAN market, structural imbalances in the Cambodian economy (high logistics and energy costs, raw material dependence of exports), fierce competition from regional players, and the unresolved issue of restructuring Cambodia's Soviet debt. The research is based on a comprehensive analysis of statistical data, an assessment of the effectiveness of current investment projects, and a comparative analysis of Cambodia's integration into ASEAN's global value chains and the institutional conditions for doing business. The scientific novelty of the study is determined by the comprehensive analysis of investment interactions in the context of Cambodia's asymmetric integration into ASEAN's global value chains, the assessment of the debt factor as a tool for converting obligations into joint projects, the identification of unique features of Russia's presence, as well as the proposal of an institutional model for interaction through the establishment of a bilateral business council focused on infrastructure projects as one of the bases for overcoming the existing "trust gap." Additionally, this article identifies unique competitive niches for Russian capital where it can be competitive despite the dominance of Asian and extra-regional players: construction and modernization of energy and transport infrastructure, implementation of deep processing technologies for agricultural products, development of renewable energy, and digital solutions.

The subject of the research is the process of the evolution of China's international discursive influence in the 21st century, particularly how China shapes its global influence through multi-level strategies in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. The article analyzes in detail the formation and development of Chinese international discourse, including its political and ideological foundations, as well as its practical application in global governance. The study examines how China expands its international discursive power through enhancing external discourse initiatives, promoting cultural and humanitarian diplomacy, and creating multilateral international platforms for dialogue. Furthermore, it explores how China, by developing new international norms and standards, challenges traditional Western dominance in the international order and actively promotes its national narrative on the global stage. The research methodology employs a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach, including case studies and comparative analysis, relying on theories from political science, international relations, and discourse analysis. Using these methods, the study investigates how China utilizes international discursive power to shape its global influence. The innovative aspects of this work lie in the first comprehensive analysis of the concept of "international discursive power" and its institutionalization in China's foreign policy, as well as in examining how China employs various strategies to shape its global influence. In particular, the study analyzes specific examples, such as the Iranian nuclear issue and matters on the Korean Peninsula, where China applies its discursive power. The comparative analysis with the Western concept of "soft power" emphasizes China's unique path in global governance, based on promoting its own narratives and creating alternative platforms for international dialogue. Additionally, the article argues that, amid escalating strategic competition among great powers, the "battle of narratives" becomes an important factor in shaping the world order, offering a new perspective on international relations.

The article examines the issues surrounding China's military presence in Arctic waters, conducting an analysis of official Chinese political documents, as well as an assessment of the political, economic, and military activities of this superpower in the Polar region. A comprehensive study of the data makes it possible to identify China’s main strategic line and its impact on addressing Arctic security issues. The methodological foundation of the study is the integrated application of complementary qualitative analysis methods, each corresponding to a specific research task. The relevance of a comprehensive analysis of China’s military presence in the Arctic is determined by several interrelated factors. First, the geopolitical transformation of the region. The events of 2022 led to the suspension of the Arctic Council’s work with the participation of Western states and the effective collapse of multilateral Arctic cooperation mechanisms that had existed since 1996. Second, the unprecedented strengthening of Russian-Chinese military interaction in Arctic waters. Third, the rapid build-up of China’s technological capabilities for operations in Arctic conditions. Fourth, the evolution of China’s official discourse. Fifth, the lack of reliable information about China’s actual intentions. Thus, the military dimension of China’s Arctic strategy represents a critically important yet understudied issue in contemporary geopolitics, requiring comprehensive scientific analysis.

The article analyses the current state and the nearest prospects for the development of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), which unites the Global South states from the viewpoint of participation of Latin American countries in the initiative. The authors aim to clarify the internal and international aspects of ZOPACAS' activities, describe its members' approach to the new non-traditional threats, and clear up the views of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay on security issues in the South Atlantic. The choice of countries is explained by the authors’ intention to trace the evolution of Latin American states’ approaches to security. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are recognized internationally for their diplomatic efforts and initiatives in the maintenance of peace and security, not only in Latin America but also worldwide. The common approaches and the unity of views on security issues is the key factor that led these Latin American states to the concept of establishing a new South Atlantic co-operation structure. The foundation of ZOPACAS was the result of the Antarctic Treaty (of 1959), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (of 1961) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (of 1967), which formed the basis for the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, the Caribbean, Latin America and Antarctica. In the article, the authors used such methods of historical analysis as the comparative method, the retrospective method, the problem-chronological and systematic approach. The methods of content and event analysis were used in working with documents. In their research, the authors rely on a broad range of sources, including declarations and resolutions adopted at ZOPACAS ministerial meetings and at the UN. The study explores the strategies and concepts of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The authors also refer to foreign and national studies on the subject. The authors conjecture that Latin American countries play a key role in ZOPACAS, setting the agenda of the initiative. At the same time, the authors note that the interests of the three countries in the forum vary considerably: While Brazil participates in the association's activities with the aim of establishing itself as a key player in the region, Uruguay uses ZOPACAS to strengthen regional security, and Argentina attempts to resolve the Malvinas issue. At the same time, the “institutional deficit” of the association prevents member countries from using the initiative’s full potential. Such a situation turns into periodic “oblivion” of the format, which in the long term raises doubts about further existence of ZOPACAS. The article is divided into two chapters and the conclusion. The first chapter examines the activities of ZOPACAS from a historical perspective, focusing on the outcomes of the ministerial meetings and analyzing its results. The second chapter focuses on Latin American states' activities in the development of the initiative.

Abstract: The Republic of Zambia was among the first African nations to recognize the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on October 12, 1979, supporting the Saharawi people's struggle against Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara. However, over the years, Zambia has shifted its position, aligning with Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed region and even inaugurating a consulate in Laayoune, a move that sparked controversy in Zambia, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU). The study focuses on the evolution of Zambia's diplomatic relations with Western Sahara, from its recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1979 to its shift toward supporting Moroccan sovereignty. The aim of the work is to analyze the historical context, international and domestic political factors influencing Zambia's foreign policy shift, as well as to examine the consequences of this change for the region and the international community. The research methodology includes qualitative analysis based on the study of diplomatic documents, official statements, and analytical publications, which allows for identifying the dynamics of Zambia's position development. The results indicate that Zambia's policy shift is linked to Morocco's intensified economic diplomacy, the influence of global actors, and the weakening position of traditional SADR supporters, such as Algeria. These changes have led to a decline in regional solidarity, particularly within SADC and the AU. The scientific novelty of the study lies in identifying the relationship between Zambia's foreign policy changes and the broader geopolitical transformation of the African continent. The authors conclude that pragmatism and economic interests increasingly prevail over historical solidarity, highlighting the challenges for anti-colonial ideals. The study's conclusion emphasizes how Morocco's economic and diplomatic strategy is shaping a new field of interaction in Africa, underscoring the need for a balanced approach to resolving the Western Sahara conflict.