The role of the armed forces in the April 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela

The article deals with the problem of the influence of representatives of the National Armed Forces of Venezuela on the course and results of the coup in April 2002. The relevance of the topic is determined by the fact that the failed coup became a key point in the first stage of the government of Hugo Chavez and largely determined the president's policy towards further establishing personal control over all institutions of power, as well as definitively outlined the harsh anti-American vector of the Bolivarian policy. The emphasis on the actions of military officials in the coup makes it possible to determine their real significant role in the April events. In this regard, attention is paid to the influence of the institution of the army in general and individual officers in particular on political processes in Venezuela. The methodological basis in the article is provided by general scientific (descriptive, analysis and synthesis), as well as historical (chronological) and political science (institutional) research methods. In Russian historiography, the episode with the coup, as a rule, was considered within the framework of global studies on H. Chavez and Chavismo in general. Therefore, within the framework of the work, more emphasis is placed on foreign historiography. These facts determine the novelty of the work, which consists both in attracting previously unused materials to the study, and in specifying the topic of the coup and the role of the Venezuelan Armed Forces in it. Based on the analyzed data, the conclusions of the work indicate that the actual intervention of senior officers in the political crisis in the country initially brought the presidency to the putschists, and then deprived them of almost seized power, ensuring the return of Hugo Chavez to the Miroflores Palace. In addition, independence in the actions of the military is emphasized in the conditions of chaos and a vacuum of power that came on April 11, 2002. In this regard, it is also indicated that specifically the senior officers acted spontaneously and were not actively involved in the real-life conspiratorial circles that were preparing a coup d'etat. Therefore, when the military most important for the coup saw that the measures taken by the putschists did not meet their vision, they deprived the right of their support and did not actually oppose the fact that another group of military officers returned the legitimately elected president to office.

Venezuela, coup d'etat, armed forces, National Armed Forces of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, General Efrain Vasquez Velasco, General Raul Baduel, Venezuelan coup d'état attempt, Avila plan, Pink tide