Modeling position selection by individuals during information warfare in society


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In this paper, a mathematical model is developed for information warfare in society whereby an individual chooses between two suggested viewpoints. The model is based on the traditional Rashevsky framework of imitative behavior. A primary analysis of the model is conducted. The model has the form of a nonlinear integro-differential equation in which the unknown function is under the sign of the derivative and within the integration limit and acts as an argument of an exogenously given function.

作者简介

A. Petrov

Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: petrov.alexander.p@yandex.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow

A. Maslov

Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics

Email: petrov.alexander.p@yandex.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow

N. Tsaplin

Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics

Email: petrov.alexander.p@yandex.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow

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