Undominatedness of Equilibria in a Mixed Economy of Arrow—Debreu Type
- Autores: Vasil’ev V.A.1,2
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Afiliações:
- Sobolev Institute of Mathematics
- Novosibirsk State University
- Edição: Volume 13, Nº 4 (2019)
- Páginas: 771-785
- Seção: Article
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1990-4789/article/view/213305
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478919040197
- ID: 213305
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Resumo
We consider a model of economy with two markets for each product: one—state and the other—competitive. Moreover, both markets coexist in the same economic space allowing free movement of goods and means of payment. In particular, it is assumed that the surplus of products purchased at fixed state prices can be sold at free prices of the competitive market. The important feature of the model is that the manufacturing activity is taken into account both in the state and in the competitive market. While most literature on mixed economies is devoted to the issues of existence and Pareto optimality of equilibria, the focus of the present paper is on analyzing their coalition stability. We continue studying the fuzzy cores of mixed economic models of Arrow—Debreu type which was started earlier for the case of high free market prices. New conditions are established for the coincidence of the sets of undominated and equilibrium allocations, covering the cases of low equilibrium prices for some of the products.
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Sobre autores
V. Vasil’ev
Sobolev Institute of Mathematics; Novosibirsk State University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: vasilev@math.nsc.ru
Rússia, pr. Akad. Koptyuga 4, Novosibirsk, 630090; ul. Pirogova 1, Novosibirsk, 630090
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