电邮这篇文章 Strengthened equilibrium for game problems with side interest of participants
- 作者: Smol’yakov E.R.1
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隶属关系:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
- 期: 卷 95, 编号 3 (2017)
- 页面: 259-263
- 栏目: Mathematics
- URL: https://journals.rcsi.science/1064-5624/article/view/225102
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562417030206
- ID: 225102
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详细
A strengthened equilibrium for conflict problems with partially overlapping game sets of participants is proposed, which is of substantial help in determining fair division in cooperative games and makes it possible to refine the hierarchy of all known equilibria.
作者简介
E. Smol’yakov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: ser-math@rambler.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow, 119991
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